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Abstract
This thesis consists of three related essays, which develop the framework to
study multilateral bargaining and strategic investments under three different
environments. The introduced novel methodologies are applied to analyze
developments in the Eurasian gas supply chain.
The first analytical part of the thesis concerns multilateral bargaining Rus-
sia and transiters for its gas, Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland. The players are
assumed to be heterogeneous, some lacking the ability to make long-term
commitments. We apply a two stage game to analyze distortions of invest-
ments into the pipeline system supplying Russian gas to Western Europe.
Our qualitative and quantitative analysis provides a strategic rational be-
hind excess capacities, which were built, and explains over/underinvestment
as an attempt to create countervailing power.
The second part of the thesis deals with multilateral bargaining and coali-
tion formation issues in the presence of externalities. We study whether
two competing supply chains, Russian vs. Caspian, are likely to be formed
or monopoly supply will be organized. We quantify the strategic value of
different investment options. We examine how the bargaining power of the
network players depends on the architecture of the existing network and
its possible extensions. We show why the players form a grand coalition in
equilibrium.
The third study focuses on coalition formation and bargaining in the environ-
ment with externalities under the hold-up. Using a two stage game we study
how the inability of players to commit to long-term profit sharing may lead
to strategic distortions in investments. We find that under/overinvestment
are likely to happen in the future, if the players will not be able to build
stable long-term relation.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit besteht aus drei zusammengehoerigen Essays, die eine theo-
retische Grundlage füer Untersuchungen multilateraler Verhandlungen und
strategischer Investitionen liefert. Die vorgestellten Methoden werden ange-
wandt um Entwicklungen in der eurasischen Gasversorgung zu analysieren.
Der erste analytische Teil befasst sich mit multilateralen Verhandlungen
zwischen Russland und den Transitstaaten fuer sein Gas. Es wird ange-
nommen dass die beteiligten Laender heterogen: einige von ihnen nicht die
Faehigkeit besitzen langfristige Zusagen zu machen. Wir wenden ein zwei-
stufiges spieltheoretisches Konzept an um Verzerrungen in Investitionen in
das Pipeline System zu analysieren. Unsere Analyse liefert eine strategische
Begruendung fuer den Ueberschuss an gebauten Kapazitaeten und erklaert
Ueber/Unterinvestitionen als ein Versuch ein Kraeftegleichgewicht zu erzeu-
gen.
Der zweite Teil beschaeftigt sich mit multilateralen Verhandlungen und der
Etablierung von Buendnissen in der Gegenwart von externen Effekten. Wir
untersuchen ob zwei konkurrierender Versorgungsketten, der russischen und
der kaspischen, wahrscheinlich sind oder ob sich eher ein Monopol in der
Versorgung herausbildet. Wir gehen auf die Fragestellung ein, wie die Ver-
handlungsmacht der Beteiligten in diesem Netzwerk von der Struktur des
bestehenden Netzwerks und seiner moeglichen Aenderungen abhaengt.
Die dritte Studie richtet sich auf die Formation von Koalitionen in einem
Umfeld mit verzoegerten externen Effekten. Indem wir ein zweistufiges Spiel
benutzen, untersuchen wir, wie die Unfaehigkeit der Spieler zu einem lang-
fristigen geteilten Gewinn beizutragen zu strategischen Verzerrungen in In-
vestitionen fuehren kann. Wir finden heraus, dass Unter/Ueberinvestitionen
in der Zukunft wahrscheinlich sind, wenn die Spieler nicht in der Lage sein
werden langfristige Beziehungen miteinander einzugehen.
Schlagwörter:
Investitionen, Verhandlungen, Verzögerungen, Gasversorgung
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Introduction
Natural gas is an environment-friendly source of energy. Its share in the
EU primary energy consumption is over 20% at present and it is likely to
increase in the future. While the consumption of gas in Europe is growing,
its domestic production is declining, so a substantial part of gas is imported.
Over a quarter of the total consumption is satisfied with gas from the Former
Soviet Union (FSU). Since alternative producers, like Algeria, Norway, and
exporters of liquified natural gas, are not able to increase their supplies
considerably, the dependency on FSU gas will grow. This fact raises concerns
on reliability and security of supplies from FSU.
In the past, a network of pipelines was built to deliver gas from the Soviet
Union, namely from Russia and Caspian Republics, including Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan, to the European market. The
pipelines of the Eurasian gas network pass across Russia, Ukraine, and
Eastern European countries connecting fields with the Western European
transport system. All issues related to the production and transportation of
gas, were resolved centrally. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of
the Republics became independent countries, each pursuing its own inter-
ests. Russia inherited the majority of gas fields and all export routes linking
Caspian producers with the European market. To insure its revenues, Russia
blocked the access to its export pipeline system and squeezed out potential
competitors, establishing itself as the only gas exporter in the region.
1
2For the delivery of its gas to the markets in Western Europe Russia de-
pended on newly independent Ukraine through which all export routes went.
Ukraine exploited its control over the essential transport capacities as a bar-
gaining chip in negotiations with Russia. To gain leverage over the transiter
and strengthen its bargaining position, Russia decided to diversify its export
routes and establish a new path to Europe. Although it would have been
enough to upgrade and renovate the Ukrainian transport system to satisfy
the sluggish demand, a pipeline through Belarus and Poland was built in
the late 90ies. The new pipeline, commonly referred to as Yamal, was twice
as expensive as investments in Ukraine.1 Its capacity far exceeded the needs
at that time and have not been fully used before 2007.
After the Yamal pipeline was completed, relations between Russia and Be-
larus have spoiled and followed the same path as with Ukraine. In response
Russia abandoned all plans to modernize the system in Ukraine or to build
a second pipeline along the Yamal track and chose a new export route in-
stead. Recently, it initiated the construction of a large offshore pipeline - the
North European Gas Pipeline, also known as Nord Stream. The pipeline will
stretch through the Baltic sea and connect Russia directly to Europe bypass-
ing all the transit countries. The new project is by far the most expensive
of all options.2 It is at least four times more expensive than the upgrade of
the Ukrainian system and twice as expensive as the second pipeline through
Belarus.
The observed investment pattern considerably deviates from "non-strategic"
investment, which would maximize the profit of the entire network and min-
imize transportation cost. Investments, to a large extent, reflect the desire
of Russia to gain an advantage in bargaining with the transiters. In this
thesis we analyze the strategic distortions of investments and study how
1The author is thankful to Frank Tauchnitz and his assistants for data about in-
vestment costs for pipeline projects, although some data can be also found on the
websites of the projects themselves, e.g. Europol Gaz about Yamal Project see
http://www.europolgaz.com.pl.
2For more detail see http://www.nord-stream.com/ .
3investments may alter the power structure in the Eurasian supply chain to
provide a rationale for the developments in the network.
Production and transportation of natural gas are characterized by large up-
front investment costs, most of which are sunk after capacities are installed.
Building a pipeline requires international cooperation among the countries,
whose territories the pipeline will pass. The parties of the supply chain have
to form a stable coalition in order to coordinate investment and agree on
long term rent sharing. Within the EU there acts an established legal sys-
tem, built on a number of Treaties, to enforce property and contract rights.
In particular, the EU members signed the Energy Charter Treaty - an in-
ternational agreement, which regulates and adds credibility to energy trade,
transit and investments within Europe. However, at present there is no in-
ternational court system established to enforce gas transit contracts within
FSU and hence, there is a risk of ex post opportunism. Once investments are
made, transit countries enjoy a much increased bargaining power. If they
cannot credibly commit to stick to a long-term agreement on profit sharing,
other countries will anticipate a strategic abuse and distort their investment.
Thus, disputes with Ukraine and Belarus highlight a commitment problem,
which causes strategic distortions in Russia’s investment.
As the gas demand in Europe is growing other FSU producers intend to
enter the European market. The Caspian Republics can export as much gas
as Russia does and do so at lower costs. Currently the Caspian producers
can reach the European market only via Russia. Unable to market their gas
directly, the Caspian producers have been forced to sell their gas to Russia at
low prices. However, with the support of the USA and the EU the producers
have developed plans to bypass Russia. The USA have offered its help to
build a Trans Caspian pipeline passing through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Turkey. The EU has suggested an alternative route across Iran and Turkey -
the Nabucco pipeline. Both projects are expensive, with transportation costs
significantly exceeding the costs of transit through Russia. Progress has also
been slow due to the difficult political situation in the region. Nevertheless,
the installation of pipelines had been made. A Georgian section of the
4pipeline connecting Turkish border with Azerbaijan is close to completion.
Turkmenistan and Iran have a tentative agreement to raise financial capital
to proceed with the pipeline.
The formation of a competing supply chain will reduce Russian profits. This
kind of externalities strengthen the bargaining position of the Caspian play-
ers. Russia has already made substantial concessions to the Caspian pro-
ducers to prevent the construction of the alternative pipelines. It has con-
tracted a large increase in gas imports and agreed to much higher prices for
Turkmen gas. In this thesis we address the interrelated issues of strategic
investments, coalition formation, and bargaining in vertical supply chains
with externalities. We provide a framework to understand the developments
of the relations between Russia and the Caspian Republics.
As in the case of Ukraine and Belarus, the investments in the Caspian
pipelines will give the transiters, Azerbaijan and Iran, a strategic advan-
tage. As a result the hold-up problem arises. In our work, we analyze how
the Caspian transiters’ inability to commit will affect investment and predict
whether the pipelines will finally be built.
The thesis is divided into four chapters. In chapter 1 we describe the
Eurasian gas supply system. We characterize the main players, review the
past investments and future pipeline projects. Besides, we provide details
of the conflicts among the countries involved in the gas supply and examine
the prospects for Russian and Caspian gas trade. In the second part of chap-
ter 1 we explain the quantitative assumptions on the parameters of demand
and supply for the FSU gas and investment costs of pipeline projects. As
the technology of gas production and pipelines is well known, we are able
to estimate production, transportation, and investment costs of gas supply
with reasonable accuracy to calibrate our theoretical models. We collect a
fair body of data about the past, present, and future gas consumption in
Europe, that enables us to make sensible assumptions on demand.
In chapter 2 to 4, we analyze the Eurasian gas supply network from three dif-
5ferent perspectives. Chapter 2 is based on the joint work with Franz Hubert.
In this chapter we look at past distortions of investments in the Eurasian gas
supply network. At that time the Caspian producers had no access to the
market and shut down their gas production almost completely. Therefore,
to simplify the analysis we do not take the Caspian Republics into consider-
ation and focus instead on the interactions of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and
Poland. We use a two stage multilateral bargaining game among hetero-
geneous players, some lacking the ability to make long-term commitments,
to analyze the situation. At the first stage the players negotiate contracts
over access rights and investments. At the second stage investment costs
are sunk, capacities are given and the players bargain about the sharing of
rents from previous investments. We apply the solution concept by Owen
[1977], which is an extension of the Shapley value (Shapley [1953]), to model
bargaining and we use the approach by Segal [2003] to analyze access con-
tracts. Our qualitative and quantitative analyses provide an explanation for
overinvestment in the pipeline through Belarus and Poland and through the
Baltic sea, and underinvestment in Ukraine’s transport system. Overinvest-
ment results from an attempt to create countervailing power.
In chapter 3 we analyze the current situation in the network. We extend
our analysis and add the Caspian Republics to the list of players, but we
exclude Poland, because as a EU member, it has a limited ability to behave
strategically. We address the problem of endogenous coalition formation and
multilateral bargaining in the presence of externalities, which result from
the possibility to form competing supply chains. Again we derive the power
structure in the Eurasian gas supply network deriving it endogenously from
the architecture of the network. However, we neglect possible commitment
problem and do not consider strategic investment decisions. We use a model
based on a game in a partition function form introduced by Thrall and
Lucas (1973). To solve the game we apply a solution recently proposed by
Maskin [2003]. Our quantitative analysis shows how the bargaining power
changes depending on pipeline options. We also find that investment options
affect the incentive to cooperate resulting in different equilibrium coalition
structures. The results allow us to explain the recent price concessions of
6Russia to the Caspian producers.
Finally, chapter 4 combines the analysis of chapters 2 and 3 to predict the
future developments in the Eurasian gas supply network. In chapter 4 we
consider the prospects for Russian and Turkmen gas supply assuming that
some players can not commit to long-term contracts. We study how the
"hold-up" problem affects coalition formation and strategic investment in
an environment with externalities. We again use a two stage model. At
the first stage, players form coalitions to invest cooperatively and agree on
the future rent sharing. At the second stage, network capacities are given,
investment costs are sunk, the players form coalitions to supply gas to the
market in the framework of contracts signed at the first stage, and bargain
over profits sharing. The two stage setting resembles the model by Kreps
and Scheinkman [1983], since we assume a capacity choice on the first stage
and price competition on the second. To find the outcome of the bargaining
we apply a concept proposed by Maskin [2003]. Based on the quantitative
analysis we observe that anticipating future renegotiations with unreliable
players, players will distort their investments. In equilibrium underinvest-
ment as well as overinvestment occurs as the result of the "hold-up". More-
over, the lack of ability to commit by producers might lead to formation of
competing supply chains. We succeed in explaining why Russia invests in
an expensive pipeline through the Baltic see, and why the expensive bypass
pipelines via Azerbaijan and Iran may be built. Besides, we show under
which contingencies Russia and the Caspian producers will cooperate and
under which competing supply chain will form.
In all those analytical chapters we calibrate the models with reasonable
accuracy to derive quantitative results which can be compared with real
world data. Hence, the European gas network provides a rather unique
opportunity to confront advanced game theoretical solutions with real world
experience.
Although the results of our analysis fit the reality quite well, there are a
number of limitations which lead to some discrepancy with the real world
7figures. Hence, several issues are left for further research. First, we do
not explicitly model the interaction of the FSU gas producers with other
exporters at the European market, such as Norway, Algeria, and African
and Middle East supplies of liquified natural gas. Rather, we model the
European market non–strategically and simply estimate a residual demand
for gas from the Former Soviet Union. Second, in our study we focus on
relationship of producers and transiters only. However, in reality major
European importers, like French monopoly Gas du France, German giants
E.ON and Wintershall, or Italian Eni. do take an active part in investments
in pipelines. Hence, a natural extension of the models would be to include
gas importers into the investment game. Third, all three models presented
in the thesis are static by their nature. We assume that the players make
investment decisions and negotiate cooperation once and for all. Hence, we
do not account for the dynamics of repeated interactions. In the absence of
an international enforcement system long-term cooperation can be sustained
by mutual threat of retaliation in future periods. This type of dynamic
cooperation, referred to as collusion, is explored in the literature on cartels
and can be applied to the Eurasian gas network. Our fourth restriction
concerns the players’ ability to commit. In the course of our analysis we
consider only extreme cases assuming that players either can commit or
not. Alternatively, one could assume that players renegotiate with some
probability.
Chapter 1
Description of the Eurasian
Gas Network
1.1 Players and investment options
In 2005 natural gas had a share of 25% in the fuel mix of the energy con-
sumption of the European Union.1 This share is likely to grow as gas is
considered to be an environmentally friendly source of energy. At present
more than 55% of the gas consumption in Europe is covered by external
producers. The major players in the European import market are Russia
with an approximate market share of 40%, Algeria with about 25%, Norway
with about 30%, and African and Middle Eastern countries, providing liqui-
fied natural gas (LNG), have slightly more than 5% (see Figure on page 25).
The demand for gas in Europe is growing, while domestic gas production is
declining. As a result, by 2015 the contribution of external suppliers will
increase to over 65%.2 Norway, Algeria, and LNG suppliers are not able
1For the European gas consumption and gas import figures see British Petroleum (2005)
Statistical Review of World Energy.
2Commission [2005] Green Paper, Para 1; Agency [2003], Table 4.2, p.140
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9to raise their production substantially and will satisfy only 55% of the gas
imports, see e.g. de Vivies [2005]. To meet the residual demand EU relies
on gas from the Former Soviet Union (FSU), in particular Russia and gas
producers of the Caspian Basin.
European countries buy gas by "take-or-pay" contracts, typically ranging
from 15 to 25 years.3 These long-term contracts are signed between a pro-
ducer and a buyer: the former commits to steady deliveries of a certain
quantity of gas, the latter is obliged to pay for that quantity whether it
is taken or not. Historically, the point of delivery is considered to be the
Western European border. Hence, producers have to also tackle the trans-
portation issues, namely transit relations and coordination of investments
in transport capacity.4
The increasing dependency on FSU gas exports raises a number of concerns,
including security and reliability of gas supplies. Russia has always fulfilled
its export obligations to European partners. It developed a reputation of
being a reliable partner during the Soviet time and maintained its reputation
after the Soviet Union collapsed. It is also worth saying that the dependency
is mutual as Russia heavily relies on profits from gas export. Currently,
the reliability problem mainly refers to security of gas transit. For the
delivery of its gas to European consumers, Russia depends on the Former
Soviet Republics - newly independent countries, e.g. Ukraine and Belarus,
3So called ‘take–or–pay’ contracts regulated prices and quantities to ensure the efficient
usage of the capacities and steady revenues. To account for changes in the economic
environment gas prices used to be indexed to oil prices. However, over a long period of
time the contracted quantities had to be paid for whether used or not, hence, the name
‘take–or–pay’ (Asche et al. [2000]). As the gas market developed, prices gained some
independence from oil prices and the current drive for liberalization favors short–term
contracts and third party access. In spite of these changes, it is still common that producers
and importers form consortia to realize new projects under long–term agreements (Stern
[2001]).
4Although gas buyers often contribute investment capital, they stay away from the
supply and transit issues as such. See "Energy Information Administration" on Adminis-
tration [2002] for more information on international pipeline investment projects.
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with whom it has failed to build long-term stable relations. The European
Union does also not have a sound political or economical leverage on non-EU
transiters. There are also no international institutions established to resolve
transit conflicts or enforce multilateral contracts. Therefore, disputes are to
be resolved through bargaining.
In what follows we describe the main features and conflicts in the supply
chain for FSU gas, which hereafter we will refer to as the Eurasian gas
network. We start with the current players of the network and sketch their
conflicts, then proceed with the characteristics of players, who may join the
network in the near future.
1.1.1 Current players
The Eurasian gas network was mainly shaped in the late 70s, when the
Soviet Union started exporting gas to the European market. At that time
a system of pipelines was built running through territories of Ukraine and
Czechoslovakia and connecting to internal gas systems of Austria and Ger-
many. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia found itself in the un-
comfortable position with its only supply route to Western Europe passing
through three newly independent states: Ukraine, Slovakia and the Czech
Republic. Looking westward towards integration with the EU, Slovakia and
the Czech Republic privatized their transmission pipelines. The Slovakian
section was acquired by the German Utility RWE, the Czech section by a
consortium of Gazprom, Ruhrgas and Gaz du France. Since yielding control
over pipelines to the importers, the countries never attempted to use their
strategic location as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Russia.
In contrast, relations between Russia and Ukraine turned sour. In principle,
Russia pays for transmission by supplying gas to Ukraine, approximately 26-
30 bcm/a (plus an additional 6-7 bcm/a compressor gas).5 This payment in
5Hereafter we use conventional units for gas, i.e. billion cubic meter a year = bcm/a.
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kind is sometimes translated into a ‘transit fee’ by assigning a price to the
gas. Besides the quantities of gas delivered by Russia for transit, Ukraine
needs additional 20 bcm/a. The conflict has essentially evolved over the
compensation for this extra gas, which Ukraine could hardly pay for. While
Russia claimed average European prices, Ukraine admitted only half of that.
However, even this lower price has not fully been paid. As a result debts
accumulated. In 2002, these amounted to $ 1.4 bn, or $ 2.3 bn, depending
on which side one takes.6
As the dispute about non–payments for gas deliveries and debts dragged
on, Russia tried to reduce its supplies to Ukraine. In response the tran-
siter syphoned off gas from Gazprom’s storages on its territory and from
European export pipelines. Russia has little choice but to supply whatever
Ukraine takes or to default on its obligations to western importers. Although
Ukraine’s withdrawals interrupted gas supplies to Western Europe only oc-
casionally for short periods, these episodes highlighted Russia’s vulnerability
and threatened to taint its reputation as a secure supplier.
Meanwhile, in late 90s the capacity of the Ukrainian transmission network,
which we will name Ukold, dropped to 70bcm/a due to aging compressors,
lack of maintenance and underinvestment. The cheapest and fastest option
to increase export capacities would be to upgrade the Ukrainian system. By
replacing old compressors the transmission capacity could easily be increased
by 15 bcm/a. Hereafter, we will refer to this possibility as Upgrade. In 2002
Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftogas reached a tentative agreement according
to which Russia in co–operation with German Ruhrgas would attract $ 2.5 bn
to upgrade the system.7 Ukraine in its turn should have given the investors
a control stake over the transit system. However, after Ukraine refused to
sell the required package of shares, Russia declined to invest in Upgrade.
Instead, as a direct threat to Ukraine’s strategic position, plans have been
6 For further detail see news [2000].
7Commission [2000–2007].
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drawn up for a twin–pipeline going to Germany through Belarus and Poland.
In 1994 Russia started the project often referred to as Y amal.8 Initially
Yamal included two pipelines with total capacity of 56bcm/a. Eventually,
only the first export line, so called Yamal 1 was installed. In the late nineties
this pipeline with a potential capacity of 28 bcm/a had compressors to
support only 18 bcm/a and reached its planned level only in 2006. Together
with the first pipeline, at major river–crossings pipes for the second band,
Yamal 2, have been laid.
To manage the transit through Yamal in Poland a joint stock company,
EuroPolGaz, was established in which Polish PGNiG and Russian Gazprom
hold equal shares. In 2004 Poland became an EU-member and since then its
transit obligations can be enforced by the European legal system. Russia and
Belarus agreed on a long–term solution for sales and transit relationships,
including the transfer of the assets of Beltransgaz, Belarus’ national gas
company, to Gazprom under a 99–year lease. In exchange, Russia would
have increased gas supplies to Belarus, which like Ukraine, buys Russian gas
for its domestic needs at a special price. Yet, the Belorussian parliament
did not ratify the agreement. Thus, Russia failed to gain control and to
guarantee security of its export via Belarus. Instead, it again found itself in
a weak bargaining position.
After the dissolution of the Union, Belarus’ ties with Russia remained very
close and its ability to act independently was fairly restricted due to its weak
economy. The country had to rely on subsidies from Russia in the form of
reduced prices on a bundle of goods including gas. However, even in this sit-
uation Belarus accumulated significant debts. Shortly after the pipeline was
installed, Belarus start exploiting its strategic position in financial disputes
with Russia. Every attempt of Russia to raise the gas prices has resulted in
8The name came from the idea to connect this pipeline to a large gas field in the Yamal
peninsular. As demand was weak during the nineties the project was gradually scaled
down. The development of the field was postponed. Only the section of the pipeline,
from the Russian border to Europe, was to be built. See the extended description and the
complete history of the project in Stern (2005).
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renegotiations over the proportional increase in transit fees. When Russia
cut off gas supply to Belarus in February 2006, the transiter took the re-
quired gas from export pipelines. To fulfil its export obligations Russia had
to compromise and restored the delivery. A number of short-term agree-
ments were produced to settle the feuds, but little progress was made to
find a long-term solution. Just recently, on 31 December 2006, a new long-
term contract was signed. It doubled gas prices for Belarus from 47$/tcm
to 100$/tcm, which is still just a half of the price Western Europe pays,
and envisaged a stepwise adjustment to international prices by 2011. How-
ever, the increase in prices is partially compensated by a 70% increase of
transit fees and by cash payments, Gazprom is expected to make for the ac-
quisition of Beltransgaz (see Yafimava and Stern [2007] for details). Given
Gazprom’s past failures in attempts to gain control over transit pipelines,
it is very likely that Belarus may again fail to implement the last step and
Gazprom’s payments would mainly offset the price increase.
Increasing frustration with the demands of transit countries led Russia to
look for a direct, though much more costly, offshore option. The pipeline,
known in 2000 under the name of North-Trans Gas and later called the North
European Gas pipeline (here NEGP), or Nord Stream, has been designed to
carry Russian gas through the Baltic sea directly to the German border. The
project was initially under the control of the German-Russian consortium of
Gazprom, Wintershall, and E.ON-Ruhrgas. Investment costs of this offshore
pipeline are at least twice as high as any onshore pipelines, and NEGP has
long been regarded as unfeasible, nevertheless, Russia started work on the
offshore section of NEGP in 2005. Originally planned capacities were from
18 to 30 bcm/a, but the new scale of the project is 55bcm/a.9
Several observations are particularly notable in this context. First, the tran-
siters, Belarus and Ukraine, failed to establish long-term stable relations
with Russia. They are involved in continuous bargaining over compensa-
tion for transit and for import of Russian gas. The renegotiations highlight
9http://www.nord-stream.com
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the commitment problem. As the result investments suffer from the hold-up
problem. Second, despite the conflicts, interruptions to Russian supply have
been very rare and short. As a rule, the players bargain and use their capac-
ities efficiently. Third, we note that Russia’s choice of investments reflects
the desire to strengthen its position, rather than investment costs. How-
ever, while the capital costs of investment projects are known, the strategic
gains can not be estimated directly. In the following chapters we develop an
approach to quantitatively assess the strategic value of investment options.
1.1.2 Prospective players
During the Soviet time, Russia and other Republics consumed a significant
amount of gas from Caspian Republics, of whom the largest gas supplier was
Turkmenistan. Turkmen gas, together with Russian gas, was also sent to
the European market. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian
producer demanded "world prices" for their gas, but the FSU countries were
not able to pay that price. Then, Turkmenistan stopped the delivery to its
former customers hoping to receive profit from export to Europe. However,
all the export routes from the Caspian fields to Europe run through Russian
territory. In the 90s gas demand in Europe shrank. To secure its own export
revenues Russia denied potential rivals’ access to its pipeline system. As a
result, gas production in Turkmenistan dropped from 84bcm/a in 1991 to
13bcm/a in 1998.10
With no other options to market its gas Turkmenistan had to agree to supply
Russia and neighboring countries for a price almost three time lower than
that paid by Europe.11 The largest consumer for Caspian gas was Ukraine.
Turkmenistan had to meet Ukraine’s demand not covered by gas import
from Russia. However, when Ukraine was unable to pay for its import,
10See gas production statistic in Stern [2005].
11Until 2005, Turkmenistan obtained 44$/tcm for its gas. As Ukraine agreed to pay
more for Russian gas, the payment to the Caspian producer rose to 65$/tcm. At present,
the price agreed with Russia is 100$/tcm, whereas Europe pays more than 200$/tcm.
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Turkmenistan simply cut its deliveries. This move put Russia into troubles,
as Ukraine threatened to take gas from the export pipelines. In 2004 Russia
signed an agreement with Turkmenistan to buy its gas for Ukraine to relieve
itself from the increased burden.
The terms of the cooperation between Russia and Turkmenistan, however,
are highly dependent on the outside options of the Caspian producer. Af-
ter 1997 the demand in Europe recovered and entered a phase of steady
growth. Producers of the Caspian region again turned an eye on the Eu-
ropean market. After keeping their fields idle for the last decade, they can
easily raise the extraction since fields are developed and equipment is in
place. The milder climate conditions of Caspian fields give them a cost ad-
vantage compared to most Russian fields situated in the permafrost terrain.
All this makes Turkmenistan, which can cover up to 80% of Russian export,
a potentially strong competitor in the European market. But to reach the
European market, the Caspian producers will have to bypass Russia.
At the beginning of the century, the USA and the EU proposed several
projects with the intention to abate the dependency on the Russian gas
supply and enhance the opportunity for the Caspian producers to access
the European market. The USA offered its support to the Trans-Caspian
Pipeline, to which we will refer as TCP . The project was first proposed in
1999 to supply 30bcm/a of Turkmen gas to Turkey across the Caspian sea
and Azerbaijan. However, while Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan were arguing
over a transit contract, Russian Gazprom accelerated its own negotiations
with Turkey. As a result, Russia contracted to supply 16bcm/a of gas and
started building the Blue Stream pipeline to supply its gas to Turkey through
the bottom of the Black sea. A key partner in the construction of the
pipeline was Italian gas monopoly Eni, who’s intentions were to extend the
pipeline further to deliver gas via Turkey to Italy. In 2003 when the USA
suggested to build a pipeline bypassing Russia, the TCP project was revised
and extended. The new plan was to export Turkmen gas via Azerbaijan and
Georgia to Turkey and further to Italy and through Bulgaria to Austria.
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In December 2006 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the Georgian section of
TCP connecting Turkish system with Azerbaijan, start delivering Azeri gas
to Turkey. The growing US influence in the region made Georgia look like
a reliable transiter. However, the project still faces a number of difficulties.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict complicates installation of the pipeline and
its security in Azerbaijan. The country has a tight budget and can hardly
pay investment costs up front. The unstable position of the country compli-
cates the attraction of the financial capital from outside. Besides, as before
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan stalled on a transit deal. Turkmenistan agrees
to give up one third of supply profit on account of transit, yet Azerbaijan
insists on at least a half. Taking into account the history of the dispute one
can assume that it may take a long time to reach a compromise.
Sceptical about the result of these negotiations the European Union favors
an alternative pipeline running through Iran to Turkey and further to Eu-
rope. However, this pipeline, which we will refer to as Nabucco, also faces
obstacles. Iran holds huge gas reserves and seems to be interested in the
project for itself. Although it is ready to pay up front for its part of the
pipeline and readily agrees on terms of a transit deal proposed by Turk-
menistan, it seems very likely that it would like to use the existing capacity
for its own supply. A pipeline connecting the Nebit Dag, Korpedze and
Okarem fields in Turkmenistan with the internal Iran grid at the Kord-Kul
node was already launched in 1999. Currently it delivers less than 10bcm/a
to Iran, but the plan for the additional 20bcm/a with a further connection
to Turkey has already been outlined. However, it is unlikely that the project
will be implemented without Turkmenistan, therefore Iran has to agree with
a role of a transiter.
Some concerns regarding the Caspian pipelines have also been raised against
Turkey. The country is located at the crossroad between Caspian and Middle
East Countries. As the gas flow to Europe was growing, Turkey became
ambitious to establish itself as an exporting country.12 There is a chance,
12Turkey imports Russian gas through the Blue stream pipeline in the Black Sea. The
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that once the pipelines are completed, Turkey would recontract to change its
role from a transiter to the role of an exporter. At the same time, however,
the country is looking forward towards its joining the EU. Hence, Europe
has some leverage over Turkey, which might be pushed to sign the Energy
Treaty, the agreement obliging its members to undertake a third party access
to transit facilities. In this case Turkey would not be permitted to compel a
resale contract from Turkmenistan. In view of this argument, it seems more
adequate to assume that Turkey will be held back, so that the Caspian
producers can rely on the access to the transit capacities.
Despite all the problems, the Caspian pipelines present a viable threat for
Russia. First, it may lose the inflow of low cost Caspian gas13 and will have to
develop new fields sooner, significantly increasing the supply costs. Second,
if Turkmenistan enters the market, Russia will meet a stronger competition
and lose a part of its export profits. In view of the competition and its
negative impact, Russia complied with demands of Turkmenistan in recent
negotiations over the export price on Turkmen gas. In 2005 Turkmenistan
enjoyed a 20% increase in prices from 44$/tcm to 56$/tcm and in 2006
the price jumped to 100$/tcm. Russia also contracted a drastic increase of
Turkmen export volumes from 30 bcm/a in 2006 to 80 bcm/a in 2025. These
concessions dampened Turkmenistan’s interest in the alternative routes. At
present it looks as if the bypass projects have been postponed.
To conclude, it is worth mentioning a few issues related to the Caspian play-
ers. First, we note that if Turkmenistan succeeds in forming a coalition with
Iran and/or Azerbaijan, a competing supply chain will form. Competition
will reduce profits of Russian gas supply and weaken the strategic position
of Russia. We will refer to this negative effect as an "externality". In chapter
amount of gas contracted leaves Turkey with 6-8 bcm/a of excess gas. Recently, Turkey
won the right to sell excess gas to Europe. Together with 5bcm/a of Iranian gas and over
20bcm/a of Turkmen gas, Turkey may export up to 30bcm/a.
13At present, fields in Siberia are at peak production or in decline. To increase its
export Russia has to develop new fields on the Yamal peninsular. This requires significant
investments and will raise the supply cost of Russian gas.
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3 we address the bargaining and coalition formation issues in the presence of
externalities and derive the strategic value of investment options. Second,
by analogy with the Russian supply chain, the lack of enforcement of transit
contracts between Turkmenistan and its transiters, results in the hold-up
problem. In chapter 4 we study how the ability to commit may affect future
development of the Eurasian gas supply network.
1.2 Quantitative Assumptions
In the next chapters we will have to calculate profits of gas supply under
various assumptions on available pipelines and investment options. These
profits depend on assumptions on demand and supply functions and on in-
vestment costs of the pipeline projects. In this section we introduce different
quantitative assumptions used further in our analysis.
1.2.1 Demand
The market, we have in mind, is represented by the core members of the
European Union – EU15, who’s share in total European gas consumption
is over 90%.14 We refer to these countries as Western Europe. The import
demand of Western Europe is covered by Algeria, Norway, LNG suppliers,
and the Former Soviet Union. The demand for FSU natural gas depends on
preferences for natural gas, the prices of other exporters and substitutes such
as oil and gas from competitors, preferences for diversifying energy supply,
the cost of transporting gas within Western Europe etc. Unfortunately, data
on gas prices and consumption in Western Europe are too poor to allow a
thorough econometric estimation. The bulk of the deliveries is under a small
14EU15 includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. We look
at the market formed by these countries as a whole, without specifying demand for each
individual country.
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number of long–term contracts, the details of which are not made public.
Available data on gas prices largely reflect oil–price movements. They are
of little relevance for the buyers tied up in these agreements. Moreover,
many of the important structural determinants of demand for FSU gas,
such as environmental concerns, preferences for diversity of supplies, turbine
technology etc., are changing fast. For simplicity, we use a linear demand
function.
In the following chapters we take three different time perspectives on the
European gas market: "past", which refers to the situation in the late 90ies,
before Yamal 1 went into operation; "current", which refers to the situation
around 2005, and "future", which reflects expectations for the next decade
in 2015. For each scenario we derive demand and supply separately. Since
there is substantial uncertainty about demand as well as supply costs, we
make ‘sensible assumptions’ to calibrate the model. We use information on
supply cost of non–FSU gas suppliers provided in de L’Energie [2002] and
Kommission [2001] to estimate a range of parameters for the residual demand
for FSU gas.15 As discussed in the previous section to satisfy the demand
in the late 90s it would be sufficient, to upgrade and renovate the Ukrainian
transport system. Hence, for "past" we choose the parameters of the demand
so as to make the existing 70bcm/a in Ukraine plus 15bcm/a of Upgrade
be optimal for the network formed by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland
(see Hubert and Ikonnikova [2003] and Hubert and Ikonnikova [2004]). This
gives us the intercept of 160 and the slope of 0.35. The resulting price of 125
$/tcm (thousand cubic meters) roughly coincides with the average market
price in 2000.16
To describe "the current situation" we take the demand parameters under
which the existing capacities along Ukraine and Belarus, i.e. 70bcm/a of
Ukold and 28bcm/a of Yamal 1, maximize the profit of the coalition of Rus-
15The detailed description of how we derive the residual demand function is provided
in the Appendix A.
16Through our analysis we focus on wholesale gas prices at the European border, treating
Europe as an integrated market.
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sia, Belarus, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iran. In this case we
find the intercept of 175 and the slope of 0.40. Finally, looking forward into
the next decade we adjust the demand function as to obtain 40 bcm/a incre-
ment in supply. This is the amount by which Gazprom plans to increase its
export deliveries to Western Europe according to Intelligence [2003]. About
20bcm/a of this amount has already been contracted by France. The rest is
expected to be demanded by the other EU15 countries, mainly by Germany.
We estimate the residual demands for FSU gas with the intercept in the
range of 250 to 230 and slopes of 0.4 to 0.3 that yields an approximate price
of gas about 195 $/tcm.
1.2.2 Supply
Costs of supply consist of production and transportation costs. Production
cost account for gas extraction and depend on terrain, climate conditions as
well as infrastructure in place. The costs vary with fields and are specified
for each producer individually. We assume a linear increasing function for
the average production cost aci(q) = m+ c · q, we use the subscript to refer
to the producer. Production costs tend to increase as production from old
low cost fields declines and new, more expensive fields have to be developed.
Hence, we again derive different functions depending on a time frame.
In the 90s the devaluation of the rouble led to a drop in fixed cost of Rus-
sian production evaluated in dollar to about mr =11$/tcm according to
of USA [2002] and Agency [2003]. After 2000 the growth of domestic as
well as of European gas demand led to increases in production. Old fields,
like Medvezhye were in depletion and new gas fields have to be tapped.
The costs of production from recently developed fields such as Zapolyarnoye
are estimated in the range of 20 to 30 $/tcm ( Bank [2005]). The cost of
mt =20 $/tcm can also be taken as a "sensible" figure for gas production in
Turkmenistan. In "The strategy for the Russian gas industry development"
Gazprom [2003] it is suggested that the costs of Russian gas may increase
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up to 40 $/tcm, if fields like Stockman or Yamal have to be developed.
Further, according to scenarios of Russia energy sector development pre-
sented by Bank [2005], we estimate the slope of the production cost function
for Russia as cr=0.4. For Turkmenistan Mavrakis et al. [2006] provide data
which give the slope of production cost for Turkmenistan ct=0.35.
Transportation costs account for operation costs and gas losses. These costs
depend on the length of a pipeline and specific features of the track. The
operation costs consist of expenses on management and maintenance of
pipelines and compressor stations m and gas losses g, that is the per cent
of gas utilized by compressors on pumping to keep the pressure in pipelines.
Costs grow with the supply distance d. For the onshore pipeline the loss
factor is g = 0.25% of gas per 100km, for the high pressure underwater
pipelines the figure is doubled g = 0.5%.17 The maintenance costs also dif-
fer for onshore and offshore pipelines. Here we assumem = 0.1$/tcm·100km
and m = 0.2$/tcm · 100km, respectively.18
The total cost of gas supply includes both production and transportation
costs. For our analysis we derive a simplified formula of the total cost
of supply. We take that the costs should include all the expenses on the
way, namely gas consumption by compressor stations and operation costs.19
17See Oil, gas and coal supply outlook (1995) for further explanations of the transporta-
tion technology.
18Maintenance costs are estimated based on operation costs details provided by Frank
Tauchnitz (Wintershall).
19With every additional 100km the expenses increase due to gas consumption by com-
pressor stations and maintenance costs that we express as follows:
tc(q, d+4)− tc(q, d)
4 = m+ g · tc(q, d) (1.1)
Taking the limit, we obtain a differential equation. We solve the equation given that
supply costs at the source (d = 0) are equal to the production cost. For further details
see Hubert and Ikonnikova [2003].
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Then, we obtain:
tc(q) = ((ml
gl
+ aci(q))egl·dl − ml
gl
)ql, i ∈ {r, t}. (1.2)
Note, transport cost parameters are specified for each pipeline l.
As we express all figures on an annual basis, we also annualize investment
cost, which are usually given in total. We use the following formula: Ii =
r·I¯i
(1−(1+r)−t) , where I¯i is the total investment per capacity. We take the real
interest rate for investment to be r = 0.15. The lifetime of pipelines is taken
to be t = 25 years.
We distinguish two types of investment projects: projects to increase capac-
ity of an installed pipeline and projects to build a new pipeline. The first
type of projects include installation of extra compressor stations and can be
completed within months. As for a new pipeline, it might take two or three
years, before the pipeline goes into operation and can deliver gas. To take
this delay into account we inflate the investment cost of new pipelines by
15%.
Table 1.1: Description of the links
Link max capacity invest. cost distance supply cost countries, forming
kl[bcm/a] Il[$/tcm] d[100km] tc(1tcm)[$] a supply chain
Ukold 70 sunk 16 17.2 Russia, Ukraine
Yamal1 28 16.1/sunk 16 17.2 Russia, Belarus
Upgrade 15 7.7 16 17.2 Russia, Ukraine
Yamal2∗ ∞ 15.2 16 17.2 Russia, Belarus
NEGP∗ ∞ 24.9 16 17.2 Russia
TCP∗ 30 23.7 38 15.0 Turkmen., Azerb.
Nabucco∗ 30 23.7 38 15.0 Turkmen., Iran
Table 1.1 gives the aggregate figures for supply and investment costs for the
investment options under the consideration. The figures for supply costs are
calculated for the total supply of one thousand cubic meter of gas. In the
table we mark with a star new pipelines, for which we inflate the values.
The first two rows of the table describe the existing pipelines in Ukraine
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and Belarus. Their capacities are fixed and investment costs are sunk. But
if we look backwards to when the first Yamal pipeline was built we find that
the investment cost of Yamal 1 was equal to 16.1$/tcm. The next two links
are the extension of the first two pipelines: Upgrade of Ukrainian pipeline
system and the second Yamal pipeline. These two investment projects are
the cheapest investment options, as one may see from the second column of
figures.
The second column shows that we limit the capacities of investment projects
TCP, Upgrade and Nabucco. To install capacity over the given limits, one
would need to invest in the extension of the connected transmission network,
i.e. the pipeline system in East Europe and Turkey. New players will be
involved and supply costs of the unit of quantity delivered to the market will
soar. In contrast, the Yamal 2 and NEGP directly join with the European
gas network. Europe is assumed to adjust the internal grid to the import
needs on its own, so no restrictions are put on the pipelines going directly
to the EU border or owned by the EU companies. We assume the length of
all the pipelines delivering Russian gas to be roughly the same. It is true for
all the pipelines except for Ukrainian system, which is about 400km longer.
Hubert and Ikonnikova [2003] have checked that this assumption does not
lead to significant change in results, while allows us to avoid additional
complexity in calculations.
tex
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Figure 1.1: The Eurasian gas supply network.
Chapter 2
Commitment and access
rights
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we analyze the development of the Eurasian gas supply net-
work in the nineties. At that time, for the delivery to the lucrative markets
in Western Europe, Russia depended entirely on transit through the newly
independent Ukraine. However, plans to upgrade the old Ukrainian sys-
tem, which would have been the cheapest way to satisfy a sluggish demand,
never got off the ground. Instead Russia designed two projects: the Yamal
pipeline, running through Poland and Belarus and the North European Gas
Pipeline - a direct link through the Baltic sea. After succeeding in negotia-
tions about control rights over the sections of Yamal in Poland and Belarus,
Russia started building the pipeline. The project of the offshore pipeline
through the Baltic sea was postponed. However, in view of disputes with
Belarus, which started shortly after the first deliveries through the Yamal
pipeline, Russia turned back to the offshore pipeline and began building
NEGP in 2005.
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The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the past developments and
answer the following questions: Why did more expensive Yamal was pre-
ferred to the project on upgrading the Ukrainian system? Why did Russia
first choose Yamal, but then initiated NEGP?1
As discussed in chapter 1 the dissolution of the Soviet Union raised the is-
sue of security of gas supply, which is closely related to the issue of who has
strategic control over transit pipelines. Intuitively, plans for new pipeline
connections reflect to a large extent Russia’s desire to strengthen its bargain-
ing position vis-á-vis transit countries by diversifying its transport routes.
Investments in pipelines generate large quasi–rents. In this case the ability
to credibly commit to the long-term profit sharing is crucial. In the case of
recontracting, a player’s bargaining power is increased if he is in de facto
control of transport capacity. In principle, a player can be asked to pay
up–front for the increased bargaining power at the investment stage. How-
ever, large up–front payments are not feasible for the FSU players. The
cash–strapped countries cannot afford to compensate others for their future
gains in bargaining power. The lack of international contract enforcement,
financial constraints and limited commitment result in the hold–up problem.
To study strategic investments we use a two stage multilateral bargaining
game, with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland being the major players.
At the first stage the players form coalitions, negotiate contracts over access
rights and invest in transport capacities. At the second stage investment cost
are sunk, capacities are given and the players bargain about the sharing of
rents from the previous investments. We assume that contracts at the second
stage are complete with respect to prices and quantities. As the number of
players is small and the basic technologies of gas transport are well–known,
the members of the Eurasian supply chain are assumed to bargain efficiently
and to make the best use of the existing transmission capacities. This allows
us to use the Shapley value, a well–known solution concept for multilateral
1As it follows from Section 1, the Caspian producers did not appear on the stage at
that time.
27
bargaining, to calculate the sharing of profits in the supply chain. The
relative size of payoffs indicates the strength of the players’ positions. Hence,
we derive the bargaining power of the parties in a very natural way from
the features of the transmission grid.
As to investments at the first stage, however, it is not always possible to write
credible long–term contracts to prevent recontracting. Otherwise, bargain-
ing over rents would never occur because everything would be stipulated
in advance. We assume that players are heterogeneous in the sense, that
some can credibly commit to comply with obligations in the future, while
others will recontract if it is in their interest to do so. Russia, for example,
has worked hard to establish a reputation for reliability in the gas market
for almost three decades. It would lose its reputation if it defaulted on its
obligations to achieve short run gains. Poland was heading towards EU in-
tegration, making it essential to be accepted as a reliable partner in business
matters. Ukraine, in contrast, has no record of honoring long–term agree-
ments. As a newly founded state it would have to forgo short–term benefits
now in order to build up a reputation for honesty in long–term business
relationships what pays off only in the distant future. Given the fragility
of its political system, it appears highly unlikely that other players would
trust any long–term commitment at face value.
The qualitative analysis of a simple model of the transportation grid shows
that investment into links which cannot be covered by contracts is decreased,
while investment into alternative but more costly options is increased in or-
der to create countervailing power. We find that depending on the relative
strength of these effects and on capacity cost there will be (i) underinvest-
ment, (ii) distorted investment in the sense that more costly options are
chosen, (iii) overinvestment, in the sense that total capacity is larger than
under full commitment, and (iv) excess capacity which will be left idle at
the production stage.
The Eurasian transport system for natural gas offers a unique opportunity
to put theoretical results to an empirical test. The various investment op-
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tions and the associated cost are sufficiently clear to allow for a quantitative
specification of the parameters and to confront the results with the histori-
cal evidence. The quantitative analysis suggests that strategic reasons do in
fact justify the neglect of the old links running through Ukraine and the in-
vestment into the new Yamal pipeline, with capacities well above what was
needed at that time. In this sense we are able to explain the past investment
pattern of the industry.
In its spirit, the analysis of this chapter is obviously related to the large
literature on "hold–up" and "second sourcing". Most of this literature as-
sumes that contracts are incomplete due to information problems, which
limit external enforcement by a third party. Possible remedies arise from
the fact, that an enforcing agency may observe at least some relevant fea-
tures, which then can be incorporated into the contract as a substitute to
improve efficiency. However, investment in transport capacity for natural
gas is verifiable, and so are most contract violations during the operating
stage. Hence, from the technical side, there appear few reasons to assume
that contractual incompleteness and the resulting hold–up problem are of
particular relevance in this market. This is confirmed by the fact that, his-
torically, the Eurasian transmission system was developed under long–term
agreements. The difficulty arises from the fact that the players involved
are sovereign nations or firms strongly connected to their respective govern-
ments. In some countries, the separation of business and politics has not
been firmly established and there is no truly independent legal system. As
there is also no international arbitration system, legal remedies are hardly
available even if it is plainly clear who is breaching the contract. Since
external enforcement of the agreements is insufficient, commitment can be
only credible if players are sufficiently concerned about their reputation.
In this sense the given study is closer to the literature on tax competition
among sovereign states (e.g. Janeba [2000]). The focus on multilateral bar-
gaining among heterogeneous players, the explicit modeling of restrictions
on contracting in coalition formation, and the quantitative application, how-
ever are all novel. While there is a small literature exploring the strategic
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implication of Shapley bargaining for choice of technology and merger in
general models (e.g. Inderst [2003], Jeon [2002]), we are aware of only one
previous usage of the Shapley value in applied quantitative studies of in-
dustrial organization. Littlechild and Thompson [1977] have applied the
Shapley value to analyze how the cost of runway construction are shared
among different aircrafts in the Birmingham airport. They found that the
existing fee structure resembled theoretical predictions reasonably well.
Finally, our analysis can be related to the literature on the gas indus-
try. Grais and Zheng [1996] and Chollet et al. [2001], and Opitz and von
Hirschhausen [2000] provide a quantitative analysis of the strategic interac-
tion in transmission systems for gas. None of them, however, derives the
bargaining power endogenously from the architecture of the transmission
system. Instead, they assume that Russia has all the bargaining power but
is restricted to set simple linear prices, while transit countries determine
quantities. Due to double marginalization, the quantities supplied to the
markets in Western Europe may be inefficiently low. In this sense, ‘excess
capacity’ is explained by inefficient contracting at the rent–division stage.
Hubert and Ikonnikova [2003] analyze multilateral bargaining in the gas in-
dustry as a one–stage game, assuming that contracting about investment
is efficient. By exogenously restricting investment options, they assess the
strategic value of each option, but they cannot explain inefficient investment.
In what follows, we start with the analytical approach to the problem, then
present the quantitative results, and conclude.
2.2 The Model
We analyze strategic investment as a two stage game among N players. At
the first stage the players negotiate over investments in transport capacities
and enter contracts over access to capacities. At the second stage invest-
ment costs are sunk, capacities are given and the players bargain about the
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sharing of the rents from previous investments. Bargaining takes place in
the framework of the access rights agreed upon at the first stage. Players
are heterogenous in their ability to commit to long-term contracts. Some
players are prone to renegotiate access contracts ex post. We assume that
the players rationally anticipate the impact of access rights and installed
capacities on bargaining at the later stage and solve the game backwards.
Hence, we start with the game dividing the rents.
2.2.1 The second stage
At this stage capacities of the network, denote them k, are fixed. The
network consists of pipelines l ∈ L, which may have sections located on the
territories of the different countries. For a section of a pipeline l which is
under control player i ∈ N we write li. To form a complete transport link
players cooperate combining their resources. To each coalition S ⊆ N we
assigned capacity vector k(S) = (.., kl, ..), where kl denotes the capacity of
a complete link l. We put kl = 0 if not all players holding a section in l are
present in a coalition. Following these notations, the entire network is given
by k(N) = k.
A coalition S uses its transport capacities k(S) to supply a quantity of gas
q(S) = (.., ql, ..), where ql is the quantity delivered through the pipeline
l. For each pipeline the following must hold ql ≤ kl. The members of a
coalition maximize their joint profit pi(k(S)) given the available capacities.
The profit of a coalition is a value v assigned to S in the game:
v(S) = pi(k(S)) = max
q(S)
p(Q)Q−
∑
tc(q(S)), s.t. q(S) ≤ k(S) (2.1)
here Q =∑ q(S) is the total quantity, p denotes the price and tc is the total
cost of supply.2 Determining this way the values for all possible coalitions
S : S ⊆ N , we define the value function v : S → R which is also called a
"characteristic function".
2All expressions for revenues and cost are understood as expected annualized figures
over the lifetime of the investment.
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A pair {v,N} describes a bargaining game of the second stage. To solve
this game and to find how the players share joint profits we use the general
solution concept of cooperative game theory - Shapley value (1952). The
Shapley value, denoted φi(v), assigns a unique payoff to every player i ∈
N . It is based on the assumption that players negotiate efficiently, form
the grand coalition, and distribute the total gains based on the expected
marginal contribution of players to the various coalitions S ∈ S. Formally, a
marginal contribution of player i ∈ N to coalition S is defined as ∆iv(S) =
v(S ∪ i)− v(S\i). According to this the Shapley value is given as
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
αS∆iv(S) (2.2)
where αS = |S|!·(|N |−|S|−1)!|N |! is the probability of a coalition S, | · | gives a
cardinality of a set. For notational convenience we extend the definition of
φ to coalitions and write φS(v) =
∑
i∈S φi(v).
We choose the Shapley value, as it is the only rule for sharing the prof-
its from multilateral cooperation which fulfills some reasonable criteria: (i)
players who do not contribute anything to any of the possible coalitions
should receive nothing, (ii) payoffs should only depend on the players role
in the game not an assumed differences in personal bargaining power etc.
and (iii) we can take expected payoffs under uncertainty (which makes sense
if players are risk neutral). Originally, the Shapley solution was obtained
from axiomatic reasoning, leaving open the question which particular (non–
cooperative) bargaining process would be able to achieve the efficient out-
come and the Shapley sharing.3 Theoretical literature has proposed a num-
ber of non–cooperative foundations of the Shapley value.4 The model of
3Myerson (1980) added further appeal to the Shapley value by showing that it is the
unique rule for dividing the gains from cooperation which obeys simple rules of fairness
and balanced contributions.
4 Ju [2004] analyzes sequential trade. At each round the players match randomly in
pairs. Those who sell their assets leave the game. The value of the assets which a player
accumulates equals the value of a coalition of the players whose initial endowments he ob-
tained through trade. When the gains from trade are equally split, the expected profits are
given by Shapley value. Inderst [2003] analyze simultaneous negotiations over contingent
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Stole and Zwiebel [1996a] and Stole and Zwiebel [1996b], which appears to
fit real world bargaining in the gas market particularly well. They look at
bilateral negotiations with a central player without whom nothing can be
achieved, assuming that all agreements can be renegotiated before any plans
are executed. Only the Shapley–sharing of profits is renegotiation–proof. In
the Eurasian gas market, Russia is a central player in the sense of Stole and
Zwiebel [1996a] and Stole and Zwiebel [1996b] and negotiations with transit
countries are usually bilateral. As a rule, there are many rounds of negoti-
ations, resulting in letters of intent, preliminary agreements etc., which will
be renegotiated several times before final deals are made.
The common ‘random order bargaining’ interpretation for the Shapley value
is also the most convenient one to illustrate how access rights determine bar-
gaining power. In this case it is considered that players enter the bargaining
game sequentially, one by one until the grand coalition N is formed. Every
new player entering the bargaining negotiates an agreement with the coali-
tion established by his predecessors and receives his marginal contribution
into this coalition as payoff. The marginal value of player’s resources will
depend on the ordering of players and the resources they have access to.
The Shapley value, which is the expected payoff of a player, is the expected
marginal contribution assuming that all possible orderings of players are
equally likely.
It is worthwhile stressing, that a coalition’s payoff does not depend on what
the excluded players do. There are no externalities among coalitions at
the bargaining stage, because Russia is an essential player. A coalition not
including Russia neither receives any income from exporting gas nor does
it compete with the group which includes Russia. Later we discuss, that in
principle, if an access regime is such, that some other player has an access to
production capacities, Russia would no longer be essential. Once competing
contracts. Each member of the higher level in a vertical chain (producer) bargains with
every member of the lower level (retailer) simultaneously. Gains from trade are shared
equally for every possible contingency, notably, the possibility that other negotiations may
fail.
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coalitions may form, externalities would arise and we will not be able to
represent the rent division sub–game in characteristic function form and to
use the Shapley value. But in the present analysis we rule out externalities
excluding the possibility to grant access over production capacities.
Once we have the outcome of the second stage determined, we may proceed
with the solution for the first stage.
2.2.2 The first stage
At the first stage the players may invest in transport capacities and enter
contracts to reallocate control rights over their capacities. By doing so, the
players anticipate the effect of their actions on the future payoff vector φ. By
assumption, some of the players are not able to make long term commitments
and are prone to renegotiate their contracts. Therefore, we do not assume
efficient bargaining at the first stage, and cannot take it for granted that the
grand coalition will form. Only credible players will form coalitions, while
unreliable players will stay as single players. The cooperation of players
at the first stage is represented by a coalition structure P = {M1,M2, ..},
which is a partition of N , so that ∪PM = N . In general different partitions
may form, we denote the set of all possible partitions by P. For members
of M ∈ P we do not assume that they ‘unite’ or ’merge’ in any sense.
They will remain independent actors at the second stage. We merely allow
that players have an opportunity to cooperate when decide upon access and
investments and explicitly analyze which form of cooperation is the best for
them. We consider the two dimensions of cooperation in turn.
We start with the access regime. Within a coalition players can modify the
access to capacities by granting and/or denying access to their capacities for
other members of the coalition. Access rights are changed through contracts.
If a player i ∈M obtains a right from player j ∈M over his resource lj we
write that they enter a contract Alji . In our case, each player owns only one
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section, so we can spare on notations and write Aji .5 We specify what type
of contracts the players can enter in the next subsection. For time being,
as an example, one can keep in mind a transfer of ownership contract, by
which a player i obtains exclusive access to a resource of j. The composition
of contracts between members of M is given by AM . Recall we assume that
only each player can enter contracts only with members of his coalition. We
denote the set of all feasible contracts for a given coalition M as AM ∈ AM .
The access structure for the entire partition is AP = (AM1 , AM2 , ..).
Access structure affects supply possibilities of coalitions at the second stage,
to express this we will write k(S;AP ). Further on, to simplify the nota-
tions, we will write k(S) for the capacities available to coalition S under the
"natural" access, corresponding to the de facto control over capacities. By
definition (2.1) the value of a coalition at the second stage depends on the
capacities at its disposal. Hence, a new access structure AP will give rise to
a new characteristic function. To stress this dependency on access structure
we slightly abuse the notation and will write v(S;AP ) and φ(v;AP ). With
the physical capacities of the network fixed, access contracts can not increase
‘the cake’, since k(N) = k(N ;AP ) and v(N) = v(N ;AP ), but may change
the bargaining power of players and the division of cake. Then, a new ac-
cess regime AM is beneficial only if it increases φM : φM (v) < φM (v;AM ).
This is equivalent to harming the players which are not in the coalition, i.e.
φN/M (v;AM ) < φN/M (v).
Besides access, the value function depends on the installed capacities k. To
make this explicit we will write v[k]. Together with the access regime, a
coalition M will obviously coordinate investments. In principle, a coali-
tion may contemplate investment into a pipeline which has sections under
the control of outside players. Although such investment suffers from the
‘hold up’ problem at the rent-division stage, it may still be sufficiently more
efficient to warrant consideration. Since pipeline investment is fairly trans-
5The exception is Russia, which owns sections in all the pipelines. But since we will
rule out contracts, in which Russia grants access to its resources, there is no ambiguity in
this.
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parent and straightforward we assume that players can coordinate on the
technical implementation of investment even if they cannot cooperate with
respect to financing and long term rent sharing. As a result all investment
would be in complete links rather than only into single sections. 6 Then,
given a coalition structure P every M ∈ P maximizes its expected profit
choosing the optimal access regime and investments given the strategies of
outsiders P\M :
max
AM∈AM , kM
Π(M,AP , k) = φM (v[ko+kM+kP\M ]; AP )− I(kM )
where ko is the original capacities of the network, kM are capacities installed
by M and kP\M are the capacities installed by the outsiders, I(kM ) denotes
the corresponding investment cost. Note, the total capacity at the second
stage is given by k = ko+kM+kP\M . For any given coalition structure P , we
can solve the problem by looking for the subgame perfect Nash–equilibrium.
We will find {A∗P , k∗P }, where k∗P are the equilibrium capacities of the net-
work under P . In general, there will be many payoff equivalent equilibria
because a particular access regime can often be implemented through var-
ious contractual arrangements. In these cases, we select the one with the
smallest number of elementary contracts. Fortunately, in our case this will
be enough to obtain a unique Nash equilibrium for each possible partition
P ∈ P.
In principle, since the profit of a coalition depends on the strategies of other
coalitions we have to account for the possible externalities across coalitions.7
6With non–cooperative funding but coordinated technical implementation, the total
capacity on link l will be given by the sum of the contributions of all players kl =
∑
i∈N kli
independently to which coalition they belong. Investments along the same track are perfect
substitutes. Alternatively, one could assume that the players invests only on their section
of a link. In this case investments would be perfect complements and total capacity would
be limited by the smallest investment along the track, kl = mini∈S kli . However, this
would require, that (out of equilibrium) players spend huge sums over several years on
pipeline projects which have no connection on others players’ territory and are therefore
completely worthless.
7For example, by investing into NTG, Russia will decrease the bargaining power of all
other players at the second stage. In this sense it imposes a negative externality on other
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To do so we represent the game at the first stage in a partition function form
by defining the function V : P→ R|P|:
V (M ;P ) = Π(M ;A∗P ; k∗P ) (2.3)
Thus, in difference to the second stage game, the values of coalitions M
depend on the entire coalition structure. A solution of the game {V,N} has
to answer two related questions: Which coalition structure P will emerge in
equilibrium and how will the players share the resulting payoffs?
Fortunately, we can avoid solving a game in a partition function form.
Thanks to the particular structure of investment cost we can collapse the
partition function into a simple value function. As we will show in the
next section, joining forces is always beneficial. Hence, we predict that
all players, who are able to commit, form one large coalition M . The
other players remain singletons. In terms of equilibrium partition we obtain
P ∗ = {M, {i}, {j}..}, with {i, j, ..} = N \M . In a sense we replace the grand
coalition N of all players with the smaller set M of those who are able to
commit. To determine how the members of this coalition share their profit,
we follow a solution concept offered by Owen (1977). We define a new game
{w,M}. Its characteristic function, w : M→ R, where M ⊆ S is the set of
all possible coalitions which can be formed by the players who can commit,
is derived from the original game {V,N} as: w(S) = Π(S;A∗PS ; k∗PS ), where
the coalition S ∈ M and PS denotes the partition which is obtained from
P by replacing M with S and M\S by singletons.8 Hence, the payoff of a
sub–coalition S of a coalition M reflects S’s power in the overall game. The
so called Owen value ψ : M → R is simply the Shapley value of this modified
game. In difference to Owen’s original model, the various coalitions S ∈M
players. On the other hand, Russia’s optimal investment will depend on whether Ukraine
and Belarus form a coalition to increase their bargaining power at the recontracting stage,
or whether Poland and Belarus form a coalition to invest in Yamal.
8In Owen (1977) PS is given by {..S..}, i.e. as if the players M\S would ‘disappear’.
Hart and Kurz (1983) show, that if the payoff of the Grand coalition is constant, both
approaches are equivalent and yield the same result as if PS = {..S,M\S..}, i.e. the
players M\S would ‘stay together’. Whether this equivalence, holds true with investment
and non–constant payoffs is an open question.
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will differ in their investment, hence, result in different payoffs for the Grand
coalition in the final game.
2.2.3 Access Regime
Now we specify the feasible access contracts. Following Segal (2003) we dis-
tinguish between inclusive and exclusive contracts, and collusion, to char-
acterize cooperation. An inclusive contract Iji grants player i ∈ M access
to j’s resources without preventing j ∈ M from using them on his own.
By changing the access regime a contract give rise to a new value function:
v(S; Iji ) = v(S ∪ j) if i ∈ S; and v(S) otherwise. Thus, at the second stage
the inclusive contract makes a difference for subsets S including i but not
including j. The effect of the inclusive contract on the expected share of a
third player k 6∈M is given by ∑S:i∈S,j 6∈S αS∆2kjv(S), where
∆2kjv(S) = v(S ∪ k ∪ j) + v(S\k\j)− v(S\k ∪ j)− v(S\j ∪ k) = ∆2jkv(S)
denotes the impact of j’s inclusion on the marginal contribution of k. A
sufficient condition for an inclusive contract to impose a negative externality
on a third player k is that the included player j is substitutable to k in the
presence of i, i.e. ∆2kjv(S ∪ i) ≤ 0, ∀S. Note, that the contract Iji weakens
player j’s bargaining power, because his marginal contributions to all subsets
S : i ∈ S, j 6∈ S are reduced to zero. Hence such a contract is only feasible,
if (i) player j can commit to grant i access to his resources, and (ii) player i
can either compensate j for his loss in bargaining power up–front or commit
to compensate later.
An exclusive contract Eji gives player i the right to exclude player j. It
amounts to: v(S;Eji ) = v(S) if i ∈ S; and v(S\j) otherwise. The exclusive
contract makes a difference only for subsets S which include j but not include
i. A sufficient condition is, that for a third player k to suffer from the
exclusion of j, is that he is complementary to j in the absence of i, i.e. if
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∆2kjv(S\i) ≥ 0, ∀S. Note, that the contract weakens player j’s bargaining
power, because his marginal contributions to all subsets S : i 6∈ S, j ∈ S are
reduced to zero. Hence such a contract is only feasible, if (i) player j can
commit to grant i veto over the use of his resources, and (ii) player i can
either compensate j for his loss in bargaining power up–front or commit to
compensate later.
As is discussed in more detail in Segal (2003) full collusion in which one
player, say i acts as a proxy player for the others, which become dummies
can be implemented by a combination of the two contracts. The inclusive
contract gives the proxy player access to the resources of the other players.
The exclusive contract prevents the rest from using these resources on their
own, hence, v(S;Cji ) = v(S ∪ j) if i ∈ S; v(S\j) otherwise. A sufficient con-
dition for the union Cji to be detrimental for a third player k is ∆3ijkv(S) ≤ 0.
In this case k decreases the complementarity between the colluding players
i and j. Note, that ∆3ijkv(S) is independent of the ordering of players. As
the Shapley value is symmetric it does not matter which player is made the
proxy and which the dummy. Hence, the contract requires (i) that j (or i)
is able to commit to fully hand over control over his resources and (ii) that
i (j) can commit to compensate j (i) for his complete loss of bargaining
power, or to pay up–front. We summarize these results in proposition 1:
Proposition 1 With capacities fixed, i, j ∈M :
1. Contracts Aji , A ∈ {I, E,C} are only feasible if i can compensate j up–
front or commit to make payments in the future, moreover we have:
2. Iji is beneficial and feasible if:
∆
Iji
(k) = ∑S:i∈S,j 6∈S αS∆2kjv(S) < 0, ∀k 6∈ M , and j can commit to
grant i access.
3. Eji is beneficial and feasible if:
∆
Eji
(k) = ∑S:i 6∈S,j∈S αS∆2kjv(S) > 0, ∀k 6∈ M , and j can commit to
grant i veto.
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4. Cji is beneficial and feasible if:
∆
Cji
(k) = ∑S:i∈S,j 6∈S αS∆2ijkv(S) < 0, ∀k 6∈ M , and j can commit to
give i control.
Where ∆
Iji
(k) = φk(v; Iji )−φk(v). It is straightforward to extend the propo-
sition to multilateral contracts.
To prevent externalities at the second stage we rule out contracts which give
other players access to pipelines and production in Russia. In other words,
we focus on access rights over pipelines only, but not to production.It is
worth recalling, that none of the transit countries, considered in this chapter,
made a serious move to establish itself as an independent supplier of natural
gas for Europe. Hence, the assumption is in line with the developments
observed. It is also natural to assume that a player can not have a right
to exclude all others from a resource without having access to it himself.
Thus, we use exclusive contracts only to emphasize the distinction between
access and ownership, not as a standing alone arrangement. Formally the
contract space is restricted to AM = {Aji : A ∈ {I, C}; i, j ∈ M, j 6= R}.
The restriction on exclusion also maintains a distinction between section
of links, for which there exists always a single player who has access, and
complete links, which may require more than one player to operate.
2.3 Qualitative Analysis
In this section we use the theoretical framework to provide for a qualitative
analysis of strategic investment in the Eurasian gas system. We consider four
independent players Russia, Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine denoted R,P ,B,
and U , respectively. The situation we have in mind is the state of the system
in the early nineties, that is before Yamal had been built. As to the ability of
the players to commit, we look at two different cases. In the first we assume
that only Ukraine lacks this ability. This captures reasonable expectations
in the early nineties, when Russia and Belarus apparently found a long–
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term solution for the transit problem. However, these agreements unraveled
later on and in the second variant we assume that Belarus, as Ukraine, can
neither make long–term commitments nor pay up–front. Investment possi-
bilities exist along three tracks: North European Gas Pipeline, Yamal, and
Ukrainian system, denoted (n, y, u). As should be clear from the description
in section 1.1, the smallest coalition for y is {R,P,B}, u requires at least
{R,U}, and n needs only {R}.
We have already described the features of the various investment options in
detail in the section 1.2. Here, we assume that marginal investment cost for
new capacities are piecewise constant. The existing capacities in Ukraine,
denoted uo are available at zero investment cost. Upgrade of the Ukrainian
system will give the total capacity of u¯ and has the lowest marginal in-
vestment cost Iu. The construction of new pipelines along the Yamal–track
through Poland is more expensive, but still cheaper than going offshore
(NEGP), i.e: Iu < Iy < In. Further, we assume that marginal operating
cost are the same for all tracks. Hence, capacities on the different tracks are
perfect substitutes, at the production stage.9 This allows us to lump all ca-
pacities together and evaluate the marginal impact of capacity on operating
profits as: max[pi′(n+ y+ u+ uo), 0], where pi is defined in (2.1). Note that
pi′ cannot be negative, as it is always possible to leave capacity idle at the
production stage.
To answer the question, which agreements the various possible coalitions
would choose at the contracting stage, we have to compare gains of players
under all possible contracts at the supply stage. In principle, the gains from
entering different possible coalitions may depend on the capacities. How-
ever, it turns out that by assuming that Ukraine is prone to recontracting
and cannot pay up–front, we can effectively rule out all contracts except
IPBR by applying proposition 1. We formulate this finding in the following
proposition:
9This assumptions will be dropped in the numerical part. At the rent–division stage
only operating cost matter, and with respect to these Yamal is actually slightly cheaper
than the southern track.
41
Proposition 2 For P{RPB} = {{R,P,B}, {U}} the access regime is equiv-
alent to v(·; IPBR ). For all other partitions the access regime is natural with
v(·) and the same as for P∅ = {{R}, {P}, {B}, {U}}.
Proof: It is easy to see that contracts involving Ukraine are not feasi-
ble. Ukraine cannot afford contracts of the format AiU and cannot make
the commitments required by AUi . Thus, it is sufficient to consider coali-
tion structures in which U is a singleton, i.e. P = {.., {U}}. Further-
more, P and B are symmetric in this game. Hence, we should check
only P∅ = {{R}, {P}, {B}, {U}}, PRP = {{R,P}, {B}, {U}}, PRPB =
{{R,P,B}, {U}}, and PBP = {{R}, {B,P}, {U}}. We start by analyz-
ing the impact of contracts, which coalitions can sign, and then we turn to
coalition structures.
Consider the contract IBR . By proposition 1(2) it is feasible, provided that R
and B belong to the same coalition at the investment stage. This contract
will weaken U at the recontracting stage, because for all coalitions including
R and P , the included player B is substitutable to the outside player U . As
a result IBR decreases U ’s marginal contribution in all orderings for which
both, R and P , precede U and U precedes B. These are 2 out of possible
4!=24 orderings, both assessing the marginal contribution of U to {R,P}.
To avoid cumbersome notations in formulas we will omit brackets indicating
coalitions and write RPUB instead of {R,P, U,B}. Hence, the impact of
IBR on Ukraine is given as:
∆IBR (U) =
1
12∆
2
UBv(RP )
= 112 [(v(RPUB)− v(RPB))− (v(RPU)− v(RP ))] < 0
The same contract will strengthen P ’s bargaining power because P is com-
plementary to B in the presence of R. The relevant orderings are those for
which R precedes P which is followed by B. Hence:
∆IBR (P ) =
1
12∆
2
PBv(R) +
1
12∆
2
PBv(RU)
= 112 [(v(RUPB)− v(RU)) + (v(RPB)− v(R))] > 0
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The last expression is obtained using the fact that at the recontracting stage
the inclusion of only either B or P to a coalition does not change its value
under the natural access, i.e. v(RP ) = v(R), v(RUP ) = v(RU).
Now we can show that forming a coalition {R,B} in partition PRB the
players have nothing to gain from changing the access regime. Moreover,
the contract IBR is harmful for Russia and Belarus, because the total impact
on all outside players is positive:
∆IBR (U) + ∆IBR (P ) =
1
12∆
2
UBv(RP ) +
1
12∆
2
PBv(R) +
1
12∆
2
PBv(RU)
= 16∆Bv(RPU) > 0
where the last line is obtained, by rewriting all expressions in terms of
marginal contributions of B (recall that ∆2UB = ∆2BU ) and simplifying the
result.
If the contract is signed under the partition PRPB it is beneficial, as it weak-
ens the only outsider - Ukraine. However, we can prove, that the members of
{R,P,B} can improve their position even further by multilateral inclusion
IPBR = IPR (IBR ). As well as IBR the contract IPR decreases U ’s marginal contri-
bution, but with respect to the coalition {R,B}. Using the same reasoning
as above we calculate the impact of IBPR on Ukraine as:
∆IPBR (U) =
1
12∆
3
UBP v(R)
= 112 [(v(RPBU)− v(RPB))− (v(RU)− v(R))] < 0
Since the contribution of Ukraine into coalition {R} is not less than to
{R,P} the impact of IPBR is not smaller than of IBR . This proves the first
claim of the proposition 2. Furthermore, one may notice, that the members
of {R,B} or {R,P,B} will not sign exclusive contract, as this would benefit
U according to proposition 1(3).
Similar to PRB in partition PPB Poland and Belarus can not improve upon
the original access regime v. The inclusive contract will strengthen the
bargaining position of Russia more, than weaken the position of Ukraine.
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Table 2.1: Access Regime and Rent Sharing in Terms of Value Function
φR(v) : + 512v(R) +
1
12v(RPB) +
1
4v(RU) +
1
4v(RPUB)
φP (v) : − 112v(R) + 112v(RPB)− 14v(RU) + 14v(RPUB)
φB(v) : − 112v(R) + 112v(RPB)− 14v(RU) + 14v(RPUB)
φU (v) : − 14v(R)− 14v(RPB) + 14v(RU) + 14v(RPUB)
φRPB(v; IPBR ): + 12v(RPB) +
1
2v(RPUB)
φU (v; IPBR ) : − 12v(RPB) + 12v(RPUB)
φRPBU : v(RPBU)
Hence, all coalition structures with bilateral coalitions have the same access
structure as P∅.
Note that proposition 2 does not depend on the capacities. In our special
context we can first determine the optimal access regime and then analyze
the incentives for investment. Furthermore, it gives a lot of mileage for prov-
ing that at the investment stage the coalition involving Russia is not effected
by externalities from other coalitions, which is a pre-condition for defining a
value function for the investment game. If there are any externalities these
have to work through investment, not through the access regime.
Table 1 describes the effect of changing the access regime for given capacities.
It gives the Shapley values at the rent sharing stage for the various play-
ers for different coalition structures and the corresponding access regimes.10
The first four rows refer to P∅, the case in which the four players act indepen-
dently and the access regime is given by v. The next two rows refer to PRPB
with Russia, Poland and Belarus forming a coalition in which Poland and
Belarus commit to grant Russia access to their transport pipelines v(·; IPBR ).
Using the definition of the value function (2.1) we can obtain the shares of
rent in terms of operating profits and capacities from table 1 by substituting
10Note that v(P ) = v(B) = v(U) = v(PU) = v(BU) = v(PB) = v(PUB) = 0, as these
coalition cannot establish a complete link.
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pi(n+ y+u+uo) for v(RPBU), pi(n+ y) for v(RPB) etc. For a benchmark
case, assume that all players could commit not to recontract, form the Grand
coalition at the investment stage and invest to maximize industry profits,
without any strategic considerations. They would solve:
max
n,y,s
ΠRPBU = pi(n+ y + u+ uo)− Inn− Iyy − Iuu; s.t. u ≤ u¯− uo
(2.4)
For further reference denote the solution (n∗, y∗, u∗).
In order to streamline exposition we assume that in the initial situation,
with installed capacity uo, some investment into upgrading the Ukrainian
system (the cheapest option) is warranted Iu < pi′(uo). Yamal is the second
best option and will always dominate investment on n, hence, we may have
two possible outcomes: (n∗ = 0, y∗ = 0, u∗ ≤ u¯−uo) or (n∗ = 0, y∗ > 0, u∗ =
u¯ − uo). First order condition for an interior solution are pi′(u∗ + uo) = Iu
and pi′(u¯+ y∗) = Iy, respectively.
Now we consider the coalition structure P{RPB}. Russia, Poland and Belarus
maximize
ΠRPB =
1
2pi(n+ y + u+ uo) +
1
2pi(n+ y)− InnRPB − IyyRPB − IuuRPB
and Ukraine maximizes
ΠU =
1
2pi(n+ y + u+ uo)−
1
2pi(n+ y)− InnU − IyyU − IuuU
where ki, k ∈ {n, y, u} andM ∈ {RPB,U} denotesM ’s investment into the
capacity k and k =∑ kM is the total capacity. The expressions are obtained
from the expected rent given in the fifth and sixth row of table (1). Since
pi′(n+y+u+uo) < pi′(n+y), Ukraine would never invest on y or n. However,
provided that pi′(uo)/2 < Iu it would not even invest into the upgrade of the
southern system, and the same holds true for the coalition. Investment is
discouraged, because both sides anticipate, that returns have to be shared
with the other side at the recontracting stage, the classic hold–up problem.
The incentives to invest in y, however, are much increased. For the coalition
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the marginal returns are given by pi′(yRPB)/2+max[pi′(yRPB+uo), 0]/2. Not
only that marginal returns on investment on Yamal receive full weight, the
competing capacities in the south are strongly discounted in the evaluation.
This increases the incentives to invest well above what would prevail in the
first best situation. Depending on the relative strength of these effects and
on capacity cost there will be (i) underinvestment, (ii) distorted investment
in the sense that more costly options are chosen, (iii) overinvestment, in the
sense that total capacity is larger than under full commitment, and even
(iv) excess capacity which will be left idle at the production stage.
Proposition 3 If Iy and Iu are high enough, there will be underinvestment.
If Iy and Iu are low enough, there will be overcapacity and even unused excess
capacity.
Proof: Note that yRPB is continuous in Iy. Hence it is sufficient to prove
underinvestment for large enough Iy and excess capacity for low enough Iy.
We obtain underinvestment: if Iy > pi′(uo)/2+pi′(0)/2 then yRPB = y∗ = 0,
if at the same time Iu > pi′(u¯)/2 then 0 = uRPB < u∗. For excess capacity
we have to show that ∃Iy so that pi′(uo + yRPB) < 0. Assume Iy → Iu and
define yˆ(Iu) by 2Iu = pi′(yˆ). Obviously yˆ ≤ yRPB, hence pi′(yˆ) > pi′(uo+yˆ) ≥
pi′(uo+yRPB). Evaluated at Iu = 0 we obtain 0 = pi′(yˆ(0)) > pi′(so+ yˆ(0)) >
pi′(uo + yRPB).11
Now we turn to the second case and assume that Belarus, like Ukraine, is
prone to recontract. This corresponds to the only possible coalition structure
P = {{R,P}, {B}, {U}}. Anticipating bargaining over rents with Belarus,
Russia and Poland would no longer benefit from a contract granting access
11The intuition behind proposition 3 is similar to that provided by Janeba [2000] for
countries competing to attract investment, which can then be exploited through taxation.
He derives that depending on the cost of capacity there may be underinvestment due to
the hold–up problem or costly duplication and excess capacity to stimulate competition
between the countries at the tax setting stage. However in Janeba [2000] there is no
bargaining over the rents.
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to capacities at Yamal (proposition 2). Hence, their expected rents are given
by φR(v) + φP (v) and investment is chosen to maximize:
ΠRP =
1
3pi(n) +
1
6pi(n+ y) +
1
2pi(n+ y + u+ uo)
− InnRP − IyyRP − IuuRP
Belarus maximizes
ΠB =− 112pi(n) +
1
12pi(n+ y)−
1
4pi(n+ u+ uo) +
1
4pi(n+ y + u+ uo)
− InnB − IyyB − IuuB
Obviously, Belarus would neither invest in u nor in n. Its incentives to in-
vest into y are ambivalent. On the one hand the coefficients of the terms
which take y into account (1/12 and 1/4) sum up to only less than half.
In this sense returns to investment are sharply discounted. On the other
hand, some weight (1/12) is put on a situation in which marginal returns
are evaluated well above social returns because the capacities u are ignored.
The coalition’s incentives to invest in Yamal are somewhat stronger (with
coefficients 1/6 and 1/2) but still weaker than in the previous case. In-
centive to invest in NEGP, in contrast, are unambiguously enhanced. Not
only that full weight is given to its marginal impact on operating profits.
Marginal revenues are also evaluated giving little weight to the capacities y
and u. This implies that equilibrium investment may be distorted even fur-
ther towards high–cost off–shore links if Belarus’s ability to enter long–term
agreements is in doubt.
2.4 Quantitative results
Based on the assumptions from the section 1.2 we solve numerically for the
equilibria of the various coalition structures. It turns out that in equilibrium
there would be no investment in links without assured access. In other words,
investment in Yamal requires the coalition of all three participants (PRPB).
If this coalition fails to form (PRP , PRP ..), there will be only investment
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in North-Trans-Gas.12 Investment into unsecured links occurs only out of
equilibrium. For example, if R did not invest in NEGP, P and B would to
invest small amounts into Yamal even if there were not in a coalition with
Russia and access would not be assured (PBP , P∅). Similarly, Ukraine would
invest into upgrading the old system on its own, if there were no investment
on Yamal or NEGP. However, given the strong strategic incentive to invest in
Yamal, respectively NEGP, these constellations do not constitute equilibria.
Table 2.2 gives the results in terms of aggregate figures and table 2.3 in
terms of the shares of the various players.
As in the previous section we start with the reference case, in which all
players could commit and optimize investment to maximize industry prof-
its (coalition structure PRPBU ). In this case investment would have been:
{n∗, y∗, u∗} = {0, 0, 15}, i.e. investment is concentrated on the upgrading of
the old system in Ukraine from 70 bcm/a to 85 bcm/a. This capacity would
have been fully used, yielding an annual operating profit (rent) of $ 5.789 bn
and a net profit of $ 5.673 bn. However, this outcome is not feasible given
our assumption about Ukraine.
For the coalition of Russia, Poland and Belarus (PRPB) we obtain a dif-
ferent picture. Rather than using the cheapest option in the Ukraine, new
investment is strategically directed into a large Yamal project with 60 bcm/a
capacity. Together with the already existing 70 bcm/a of Ukold, total ca-
pacity reaches 130 bcm/a of which a staggering 40 bcm/a are subsequently
left idle. Sales of 90 bcm/a generate an operating profit of $ 5.826 bn, which
is reduced by high investment cost to a net profit of only $ 4.530 bn. In
order to calculate how Russia, Belarus and Poland share the joint profit we
have to look at the game in which every player acts on its own (P∅). In
equilibrium there is no investment in Yamal but a very large investment of
54 bcm/a in North European Gas Pipeline resulting in a total capacity of
12This implies that equilibrium investment does not depend on the formation of bilat-
eral coalitions. Hence, in equilibrium there are no externalities across coalitions through
investment. Together with proposition 2 we can rule out externalities altogether and
calculate the Owen value for the game at the investment stage.
48
Table 2.2: Equilibrium Capacities, Quantities, Aggregate Profits
invest capacity price operat invest net profit
{n, y, u} [quantity] profit/rent cost
bcm/a bcm/a $/tcm $ mln/a $ mln/a $ mln/a
First best {0, 0, 15} 85 [85] 119 5789 116 5673
Coalition: RPB {0, 60, 0} 130 [90] 118 5826 1296 4530
No Cooperation {54, 0, 0} 124 [88] 118 5755 1345 4410
124 bcm/a at the production stage.
The figures for profit sharing explain why countervailing power is so impor-
tant in this transmission system. If Russia had naively followed the first
best investment strategy, paying for the upgrade in Ukraine up–front and
then had been forced to bargain over rents, its bargaining power would
have been poor. Rents would have been shared equally between Russia and
Ukraine because both players are necessary for the operating of the system.
The resulting net–profit of $ 2.779 bn for Russia compares to $ 4.073 bn
which Russia can achieve by forming a coalition with Poland and Belarus
and spending $ 1.296 bn annualized investment cost on Yamal. Russia in-
creases its net–profit, mainly by decreasing Ukraine’s share. While total
profit declines by app. $ 1.143 bn due to inefficient investment, Russia in-
creases its profits by roughly the same amount. With a $ 0.106 bn each, the
shares of Poland and Belarus are modest, because Russia’s outside option,
North–Trans–Gas, ensures already a hefty net–profit of $ 3.967 bn.
As to the magnitude, these figures appear to overestimate the distortion
if compared to real world investment. While investment in Upgrade was
in fact close to zero, the Yamal pipelines has only half of the capacity we
predict. This discrepancy between the predictions of the model and reality
is not to be resolved by reasonable changes in the numerical values of our
parameters. Instead, we see two structural deficiencies of our model which
are responsible. First, our model tends to exaggerate the strategic aspect
by assuming that investment can take place only once. In reality bargaining
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Table 2.3: Shares of Net–Profits and Rents
variant Russia Poland Belarus Ukraine
(rent) profit profit profit rent
$ mln/a $ mln/a $ mln/a $ mln/a $ mln/a
Grand Coalition 4847 27 27 773
First best investment (2895) 2779 0 0 2895
but recontracting
Coalition: RPB 4073 106 106 245
No Cooperation (5312) 3967 0 0 443
over rents is not only influenced by capacities established in the past but
also by options to extend the system in the future (Hubert and Ikonnikova
[2003]). This will reduce the need to actually spend money on capacities. It
is worthwhile to recall that plans, feasibility studies and even some prepara-
tory investment have been made for a capacity of to 56 bcm/a along the
Yamal track. Then pipelines with a capacity of 28 have been installed, but
investment in compressors stopped short at 18 bcm/a. Given that pipelines
are already in place, an increase of capacity by adding compressors is cheap
and fast and everyone understands this possibility, hence there is no need
to actually waste the money.
Second, our assumption, that players can be clearly separated into those
who can commit and those who cannot is overly simplistic. The assumption
that Poland and Belarus can commit, appears not unreasonable for the early
nineties, but it is cast into doubts by recent developments. Attaching a small
probability of recontracting with either Poland or Belarus would certainly
reduce the appeal of the Yamal project. However, a quantitative assessment
of this argument is left for further research.
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2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we derive the bargaining power of the different players along
the supply chain of Eurasian gas endogenously from the architecture of
the transmission system and its possible extensions by applying coopera-
tive game theory for multilateral negotiations. As the number of players is
small and the cost parameters of gas transport are well–known, we assume
that the members of the Eurasian supply chain bargain efficiently and make
the best use of the existing transmission network. This allows us to use the
Shapley value to calculate the sharing of profits along the vertical supply
chain.
However, in the case of pipelines much of the investment in transport infras-
tructure is sunk, and therefore prone to ex–post exploitation of quasi–rents.
Since there is no international court system to enforce contracts between in-
dependent nations, long–term commitments can only be achieved between
players who are sufficiently concerned about their reputation. If opportunis-
tic renegotiation cannot be prevented, the well–known hold-up problem may
lead to inefficient investment, even if the bargaining process itself is efficient.
While we assume that contracts are complete regarding prices and quanti-
ties, as is required for the efficient use of the existing network, we allow
them to be incomplete with respect to the lifetime of investment projects.
This means that at least some players may recontract in order to appro-
priate quasi rents from sunk investment. Since other players will anticipate
recontracting, they may refuse to invest, or overinvest in alternative routes
in order to create countervailing power.
Our qualitative and quantitative analysis show that in spite of large capacity
cost, overinvestment and excess capacity are not a mere theoretical possibil-
ity in the Eurasian transport system for natural gas. Given the particular
geography of this network, and the inability to make credible long term
commitments or large up–front payments on part of Ukraine, there is in fact
much to gain from creating countervailing power. Hence, overinvestment
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into new pipelines and underinvestment into existing ones are a result of
rational strategic calculations.
tex
Chapter 3
Bargaining with externalities
and strategic value of
investment options
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we proceed with the analysis of the current situation in the
Eurasian gas supply network. To reflect the important role, which gas from
the Caspian region will play in the future, we extend the list of players by
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iran. As already discussed in chapter 1, if
these countries succeed in cooperation, a competing supply chain will form.
This will impose negative externalities on the Russian supply coalition and
change the power structure in the network. In this chapter we address two
interrelated questions: whether the competing supply chains are likely to
form and how the players bargain in the presence of externalities.
During the recent negotiations concerning compensation for gas transit,
Ukraine and Belarus exploited their control of the essential transport ca-
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pacities to achieve higher profit. However, Russia can build additional ca-
pacities and by this change the status quo balance of power. Therefore, the
view that the bargaining power is determined solely by existing capacities,
is somewhat shortsighted. A farsighted player should take into account both
the existing capacities and all options to extend the network to obtain a
comprehensive assessment of the bargaining power. For different pipelines
it takes different time to be built. Intuitively, the faster a pipeline can be
built, the greater will be its impact on the power structure in the network
and hence, on payoffs. In this chapter, we look at how the balance of bar-
gaining power changes depending on the availability of investment options.
We adopt a shortsighted and farsighted perspectives and thus, avoid the
complexity of a dynamic model, in which the options are to be discounted
to reflect the time required to build a pipeline. Instead, we provide a range
of possible outcomes of a dynamic model. We assess the strategic rele-
vance of different pipeline options to understand the recent developments
in the Eurasian gas supply network, namely concessions of Russia to Turk-
menistan, the tougher attitude of Russia vis-a-vis Ukraine and Belarus, and
the initiation of expensive pipeline projects, such as TCP, Nabucco, and
NEGP.
We develop a framework to analyze the cooperation between producers and
transiters and examine the balance of power in the Eurasian gas supply
network. As in the previous chapter, we derive the bargaining power and a
coalition structure in the network endogenously. However, in the presence
of externalities, we cannot describe the bargaining game in characteristic
function form, since a value of a coalition depends on the allocation of the
players outside. We also can not apply solution concepts, such as Shapley
value (1953), Owen value (1977), core, and etc.. Instead we introduce a
model of bargaining and endogenous coalition formation game in a partition
function form. The partition function assigns a profit to each coalition
depending on the partition of players into coalitions and hence, allows to
capture externalities.
A number of solution concepts have been proposed for games in parti-
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tion function form (PFF). Some authors have developed extensive form ap-
proaches to a PFF game, e.g. Bloch [1996], Ray and Vohra [1996], Ray and
Vohra [1999], and Gomes [2005]. These models are differ in protocols, which
determine the order of players’ moves and hence, how a game develops. To
avoid protocol dependency of the outcome various axiomatic solutions have
proposed, e.g Do and Norde [2002], Ju [2004], de Fontenay and Gans [2004],
and Clippel and Serrano [2005]. The models characterize a modification of
the Shapley value and are based on the assumption that a grand coalition
always forms. This assumption considerably limits the implication these so-
lutions. For our analysis, we choose another solution concept which has been
proposed by Maskin (2003). The approach of Maskin (2003) is based on the
"random order bargaining" concept, which essentially describes a game in
extensive form. However, to specify the development of the game Maskin
(2003) uses a set of axioms. Thus, Maskin (2003) offers a procedure simi-
lar to the one used for the Shapley value. A major advantage of Maskin’s
(2003) axiomatic solution is that it determines both the expected coalition
structure and the expected payoffs of players endogenously.
Through our quantitative analysis we derive the strategic importance of dif-
ferent investment options. In this chapter we do not explain investment pat-
terns as such, but rather investigate how the mere possibility to extend the
network affects the balance of bargaining power. In particular, we quantify
the effect of every particular pipeline option on the bargaining position of
players. Our results highlight the importance of outside options in strength-
ening the bargaining power. We find that the expensive North European
Gas Pipeline as well as TCP and Nabucco and valuable for strategic reasons.
We show how the bargaining power of the transiters vis-a-vis the producers
depends on bypass options and how fast they can be built. The possibility
to increase capacities of the transiters do not yield any strategic benefit to
the producers, but can only weaken their bargaining position. This fact un-
folds why Russia postpones investing to upgrade and renovate the Ukrainian
transmission system and the Yamal pipeline in Belarus.
Apart from other differences, previous studies of the Eurasian gas supply
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network, e.g. Grais & Zheng (1996), von Hirschhausen et al. [2005], and
Holz and Kalashnikov [2005], focus only on the relation of Russia and its
transiters, so that the issue of externalities does not arise. Overall, we are
not aware of any study tackling the coalition formation issue. Hence, we
pioneer in this respect as well.
From a standpoint of a general bargaining problem with externalities, our
work relates to studies on other topics. In particular, Eyckmans and Tulkens
[2001] explore the issue of Kyoto protocol, where players are countries and
externalities are emissions affecting the environment of others. Jehiel and
Moldovanu [1996] study a patent acquisition problem, in which oligopoly
firms collude to buy an innovation from a rival. Fridolfsson and Stennek
[2002] analyze preemptive mergers, where firms merge with the hope of
avoiding the negative externalities of being an "outsider" of the deal. Fi-
nally, Calvert and Dietz [1998] consider the formation of political parties.
All these studies use the Nash equilibrium and Markov equilibrium solution
concepts to find an outcome of a coalition formation game. To the best of
our knowledge, our work is the first attempt to use the solution of Maskin
(2003). Besides, we are aware of only two previous application of a partition
function form game to analyze a real world problem. Eyckmans, Tulkens
(2001) applied PFF game to study greenhouse gas emissions and Pintas-
silgo (2003) use PFF game to analyze the Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna
fisheries. Both focus on a fair sharing rule for the distribution of the returns
from cooperation, which will ensure stability of a coalition structure. Our
approach is different since we derive the sharing of the profit endogenously.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the following section we
proceed with the model and its solution. Next, we present the results and
their interpretation. Section 4 concludes.
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3.2 The model
3.2.1 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce a formal model of the game and its solution.
Let N = {.., i, ..} be a set of players. The players form coalitions Sk ⊆ N .
The set of coalitions P = {.., Sk, ..} is called a partition, or a coalition struc-
ture. We denote a set of all possible partitions by P. We assume coalitions
embedded in any partition are pairwise disjoined Sk ∩ Sh = ∅ for all k 6= h.
Further, we will distinguish terminal partitions formed by all the players
PN : ⋃|PN |k=1 Sk = N , where | · | denotes cardinality, and partial partitions
P formed by K ⊆ N . With respect to a terminal partition, we say that a
grand coalition forms when all the players cooperate forming one coalition
PN = {N} .
We model the situation in which multiple competing coalitions may form.
The profit, or value, of a coalition may not only depend on the members of
the coalition, but also on the allocation of the outsiders into coalitions, i.e.
on the entire partition. Therefore, we choose the partition function approach
proposed by Thrall and Lucas (1963). A partition function w : PN → R|PN |
maps all possible terminal coalition structures PN ∈ PN into a vector of
values for embedded coalitions w(S;PN ).
The pair (N,w) represents a game in a partition function form (PFF). The
advantage of the PFF approach is that it captures the presence of external-
ities. Formally, we speak of externalities whenever
∃S : w(S;P ) 6= w(S;P ′) , for P \ Sk \ Sj = P ′ \ {Sk ∪ Sj} (3.1)
i.e. there is at least one coalition, which value changes with a change in
a partition. When the inequality sign in (3.1) becomes "greater than", the
externalities are negative. In this case the union of the coalitions Sk and Sj
impose a loss on S. If the inequality sign is "less than", the externalities are
positive. This means that the merger of Sk and Sj brings S a gain.
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The presence of externalities prevents us from using the standard approach
of cooperative game theory - the characteristic function (CF), for which
a number of general solution concepts exists such as core, Shapley value,
and bargaining set. The characteristic function assigns a coalition its worth
disregarding the actions of outsiders. Hence, it cannot account for external
effects across coalitions. For that reason, we use the partition function
approach instead.
Similar to Shapley (1953), we want the solution of the game (N,w) to assign
a vector of expected payoffs E[ψ∗] to all players i ∈ N . However, unlike a
game in a characteristic form, we can not expect that the grand coalition
will always form. Therefore, we are also interested in finding a probability
distribution of equilibrium partitions p(P ∗).
3.2.2 Solution concepts for PFF
To solve a PFF game various algorithms have been proposed. Different
works focus on different outcomes for PFF games. Some authors assume
that the grand coalition always forms in equilibrium and offer an axiomatic
approach to derive a vector of payoffs to players as a modified Shapley value,
e.g. Do, Norde (2002) and Ju (2004). Others search for equilibrium, or
stable, coalition structures assuming a particular exogenous payoff function,
see Bloch and Gomes [2006], Bloch [2002], Bloch [1996]. A series of works
developed a core concept for PFF considering a simultaneous-move game
with various sharing of coalitional profits (see Funaki and Yamato [1999],
and Tulkens and Chander [1997], and Koczy [2004]). To find the values of
coalitions, such works assume that players have "conjectures" on outsiders’
actions. Conjectures can be pessimistic, when outsiders act as to minimize
the value of a coalition, or they can be optimistic, when the structure of
outsides is such that a coalition achieves its maximum value, or they can
be a probabilistic combination of the two. Unfortunately, these models give
contradictory conclusions, along with the result, that the core can be empty
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or not unique.
An alternative to "conjectures" and axiomatic approaches is an extensive
form game approach. Under this approach, the formation of coalitions is seen
as a sequential process, whereby players foresee the reactions of outsiders
on their cooperation. In the extensive form framework, Ray, Vohra (1996,
1999) first proposed to derive both an equilibrium coalition structure and
payoffs of players endogenously. In addition, the authors introduced a new
assumption, which became fundamental in PFF modelling. They suggested
transfers are allowed within coalitions, but not across coalitions, and that
members of each coalition play cooperatively so as to maximize the value of
the coalition, while different coalitions engage in a non-cooperative game.
However, most of the extensive form approaches also appear to have a draw-
back: the outcome of the game is strongly dependent on the protocol of the
game. The protocol defines the order in which players make proposals and
corresponding responses in a coalition formation process. In an attempt to
overcome the dependency on protocol, endogenous order (Brown and Chi-
ang [2003]) and random order models (Montero [1999], Gomes (2001, 2005))
were offered. Brown and Chiang (2003) found out that to solve the endoge-
nous order game, in which players first bargain on who will be a proposer,
transfers across coalitions must be allowed. However this violates the funda-
mental assumption of PFF games. In the course of her analysis of a random
order game, where the proposer is chosen at random, Montero (1999) had
to assume that once a coalition is formed it exits a game to rule out cycling.
To illuminate this restriction, Gomes (2001, 2005) has offered a dynamic
model in which players continuously renegotiate coalitions until all gains
from cooperation are exhausted. Finally, Bloch and Gomes (2006) combine
the features of different models and allow for endogenous exit of coalitions
from the coalition formation and bargaining process.
For our analysis, we adopt a different solution concept, which has been
recently proposed by Maskin (2003). In this approach, the players negotiate
sequentially and the game is described in an extensive form. However, in
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contrast to protocol games the solution of Maskin (2003), similar to the
Shapley value, is characterized by a set of axioms. The axioms specify how
players are allocated into coalitions and payoffs are determined. Unlike the
other axiomatic solutions, the solution of Maskin (2003) does not presume
that the grand coalition always forms and an equilibrium coalition structure
is derived endogenously. In addition, Maskin (2003) proves that in the
case without externalities, his solution yields the Shapley value. Hence, the
approach can be thought as a generalization of the Shapley value for PFF
games.
3.2.3 The model
To introduce the extensive form Maskin (2003) uses the random order bar-
gaining procedure developed by Weber (1988). The procedure is commonly
used in cooperative game theory to represent bargaining, in particular to
depict the general solution concept - Shapley value (1952). Under ran-
dom order bargaining, coalition formation is considered as a sequential pro-
cess. The players enter the bargaining process one by one in some order
θ = {.., θi, ..}, where θi gives the entry number position of a player i. When
player i enters the game, he observes a partial partition P formed by his
predecessors j : θj < θi. At each node of the game, represented by the pair
(P, i), the new coming player chooses to join one of the existing coalitions or
to start a new one. We will use a subscript to point out, which coalition the
player joins: if player i joins S ∈ P then P → PS∪i. If the player sets a new
coalition P → P ∪{i} we write P{i}. Decisions on allocation are irreversible
so that coalitions may only increase but not break apart.
Given the allocation, the player is assigned a payoff. The payoff depends
on the partition function, the order, and the partial partition P , which
has formed: ψi(w, θ, P ). We will distinguish the equilibrium payoff vector
ψ∗(w, θ) under the terminal equilibrium coalition structure P ∗(θ) given the
order θ and a payoff vector ψ(w, θ, PN ) corresponding to some terminal
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partition PN . To simplify notation we will omit the argument w in the
payoff function assuming that a partition function is given.
The overall solution is obtained as a randomization over all possible θ. Fol-
lowing Maskin (2003), we assume the orders of players to be equally probable
Pr(θ) = 1/|N |! and calculate the expected payoff vector of the game as:
E[ψ∗i ] =
∑
θ∈Θ
1
|N |! · ψ
∗
i (θ) (3.2)
The probability distribution for the equilibrium partition is obtained as the
probability weighted collection of P ∗(θ).
Maskin (2003) accepts the fundamental assumption that players cooperate
within and play non - cooperatively across coalitions. This property is ex-
pressed in the first axiom:1
(i) the sharing of joint profits within each coalition should be Pareto optimal
for any terminal partition∑
i∈S
ψi(PN ) = w(S;PN ) for ∀S, PN (3.3)
where ψ(PN ) is the payoff vector given some partition of players PN . The
axiom requires that coalitions distribute their profits fully among their mem-
bers. This condition is sometimes called "budget-balancing" and was justi-
fied by Aumann and Dreze (1974) and Hart and Kurz [1983].
Maskin (2003) applies backward induction to solve the extensive form game.
To that end, he formulates the second axiom, which states consistency, or
sequential rationality, of the equilibrium outcome as follows:
(ii) for any i and partial partition P , if i is assigned to S ∈ P and S∪i ⊆ S∗
1In the course of the paper we change the original sequence of the axioms by Maskin
(2003). We start with the axioms describing the properties of the solution common to
other PFF solutions, and then formulate the specific to Maskin (2003) ones.
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where S∗ ∈ P ∗(θ), then the equilibrium partition P ∗(θ) resulting from
P is the same as the one resulting from PS∪i, and so is the payoff
vector ψ∗(P ∗(θ)) = ψ∗(P ∗S∪i(θ))
There remain two questions to be answered: to which coalition is a player
allocated and how are payoffs to players determined? The answers are spe-
cific to Maskin (2003) and are the essence of his solution. By his third
axiom, Maskin (2003) demands efficiency of a players’ allocation: a player
joins the coalition such that his allocation has the greatest impact on the
profit of this coalition. The impact of the player’s allocation also reflects
externalities. It is a relative measure and corresponds to a particular al-
ternative. Namely, it is presented by the gross marginal contribution of a
player to a coalition S given the alternative coalition S′ , that is how much
a profit of S changes if the player instead of joining this coalition will join
S
′ : w(S ∪ i;PNS∪i) − w(S;PNS′∪i). A positive contribution creates incentives
for coalitions to attract the player, since they will lose otherwise.
The partition function w gives the worth of coalitions under all possible
terminal partitions PN . Yet, to continue with axioms for allocation and
assignment of payoffs we need to know the values of the coalitions embedded
in partial partitions. We denote them w˜(S;P ). Since we solve the game
backwards, we can determine the allocation and the payoff of the last player
l : θi < θl for ∀i for all possible PN knowing only w. Then, we can reduce
a game to N \ l, and calculate the values of coalitions in partitions PN \ l.
For the coalitions not including l the value is w˜(S;PN \ l) = w(S;PN ), for
the coalition S′ ∈ PN : l ∈ S′ the w(S′ ;PN \ l) = w(S′ ;PN ) − ψl(PN ).
Generalizing, for a partial partition P formed by j : θj < θi we obtain:
w˜(S;P ) = w(SN ;PN )−
∑
i∈SN\S
ψi (3.4)
where SN ∈ PN and S ⊆ SN
In words, the value w˜ can be interpreted as an undistributed profit of a
coalition S.
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Now we proceed with the third axiom
(iii) each player is allocated to the coalition S ∈ P , to which his gross
marginal contribution is greatest
w˜(S ∪ i;PS∪i)− w˜(S;PS′∪i) ≥ w˜(S′′ ∪ i;PS′′∪i)− w˜(S′′;PS∪i) (3.5)
∀S′′ : S′′ 6= S S′ = argmax
S′′
[w˜(S′′ ∪ i;PS′′∪i)− w˜(S′′;PS∪i)] (3.6)
In words, of all possible alternatives S′′ one finds the one S′ , compared to
which the allocation of i to S has the largest impact (3.6). The coalition S
attracts the player if the contribution of the player to S with respect to S′
is greater than to S′ with respect to S.
In a competition for a new player coalitions should be able to offer him at
least as much as the others are ready to pay. In the result, payoffs of players
are defined as follows:
(iv) every player earns his opportunity payoff, i.e. the second greatest gross
marginal contribution
ψi(P, θ) = w˜(S′ ∪ i;PS′∪i)− w˜(S′;PS∪i) (3.7)
3.2.4 Equilibrium
According to Maskin (2003) for any superadditive game (N,w) the solution,
satisfying axioms (i)-(iv) exists. This claim is proved as Theorem 1. The
proof is done by construction and is based on the case of |N | = 3. Maskin
(2003) asserts that for |N | > 3 the result of the theorem holds as well.
However, we have found that, in general, this is not true. We present our
finding in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 For a game in partition function form (N,w) with |N | > 3,
a solution pair (E[ψ∗], p(P ∗)) satisfying axioms (i)-(iv) may not exist
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We prove this proposition by an example, which is given in Appendix 4.4.
Furthermore, in Theorem 2, Maskin (2003) claims that if all externalities
are non-positive the solution (E[ψ∗], p(P ∗)) fulfilling the axioms (i)-(iv) is
unique. Once again the proof is done by construction for N = 3. In the
course of our analysis we have revealed that this claim is not necessarily
valid for |N | > 3. We state this result as
Proposition 5 For a game in a partition function form (N,w) with |N | > 3
in which all externalities are nonpositive, that is for any S, Sk, and Sj:
w(S;P ) 6= w(S;P ′), where P \ Sk \ Sj = P ′ \ {Sk ∪ Sj}, the solution
(E[ψ∗], p(P ∗)) may not be unique
A proof by example is provided in Appendix 4.4.
In our study the number of players N = 6 and, according to propositions (4)
and (5) we may encounter the problems of non-existence and multiplicity.
Non-existence of an equilibrium is a conceptual problem since in this case
it is not clear what the outcome of the game is.2 There is no reasonably
simple way to show in which cases an equilibrium always exists in general.3
Fortunately, in our calculations we have not encountered the problem of
non-existence. This is largely due to a specific property of our game. We
formulate this finding in
Proposition 6 For a game in a partition function form (N,w) with |N | > 3
the solution (E[ψ∗], p(P ∗)) exists, if at any node (P, i) of the game there exist
at most one coalition S ∈ P for which it matters to which of the alternative
2Note, however, that the solution of Maskin (2003) is not the only one susceptive to
the non-existence problem. There are many others solutions, in particular, those based
on a Nash equilibrium, in which an equilibrium may not exist.
3See Ikonnikova and Willems (2007) for a further discussion on possible refinements
to overcome the problem of non-existence and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium to
exist.
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coalitions the new player is going to be allocated, so that
w˜(S;PS′∪i) 6= w˜(S;PS′′∪i)
and for all other S˜ 6= S it holds true that
w˜(S˜;PS′∪i) = w˜(S˜;PS′′∪i)
We prove proposition (6) and discuss in more detail the properties of our
game in Appendix 4.4.
As multiple equilibria are concerned, they do occur in the course of our
analysis. However, this does not present a severe problem since the choice
of an equilibrium does not change the outcome of the game. In our analysis,
multiplicity occurs only when the contribution of a player to all coalitions
is zero. According to axiom (iii) the player can then be allocated to any
coalition. As the number of such cases is small, we have been able to check
that the allocations and the payoffs of the other players do not depend on the
allocation of that player. To avoid additional complexity in computations
we apply a simple tie-breaking rule: we assign such a player to the coalition
formed by the first player.
3.2.5 Partition function
Finally, we explain how we calculate the values of the partition function.
In our application, we assume, that coalitions of the terminal partition play
Cournot competition. Forming a coalition players combine their initial re-
sources k0S =
∑
i∈S k0i . Once the coalition structure has formed, coalitions
simultaneously make their decisions on supply quantities q∗S and on invest-
ments in additional capacities kS −k0S as to maximize coalitional profits piS .
Hence
pi∗S = max
qS ,kS
p(
∑
S∈P ∗
qS)qS − tc(qS)− I · (kS − k0S), qS ≤ kS (3.8)
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where p(q) is the inverse demand function, tc(q) - total cost of supply, and I
- per unit investment costs. The solution of the optimization problem (3.8)
will give us the values of the partition function w(S;PN ) = pi∗S and total
optimal capacity of the network ∑S∈P k∗S :
w(S;PN ) = pi∗S(q∗S1 , .., q
∗
S , .., q
∗
Sm) (3.9)
where the quantities do not exceed the capacities available to the coalition
q∗Sk ≤ k∗S .
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Values of partition function
We calibrate the model to reflect the situation around year 2005, as described
in section 1.2. The resulting values of the partition function and some other
results are reported in table 3.1.4 In the table we provide the results for the
two extreme cases.
In the upper part of the table, entitled "all options", we present the profits
and equilibrium capacities for coalitions when the players take into account
both the existing pipelines and all pipeline options. This variant corresponds
to the ultimate case in which all players are farsighted. In the lower part
of the table, entitled "status quo", we assume that the players consider only
the installed capacities. Hence, the figures reflect a shortsighted view. The
complete table, with various investment options taken into consideration, is
given in Appendix 4.4.
The table is organized as follows. In the first column we list the coalition
structures under which the network described by the following seven columns
4We perform all calculations using Mathematica 5.1. The source files are available
upon request.
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can be implemented. We denote the players using the first letters of their
names, i.e. the set of players N={r, u, b, t, a, i} consists of Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iran, respectively.5 For simplicity,
we indicate only essential coalitions, which include at least one producer,
since only such coalitions may organize supply and earn positive profit. We
do not show the allocation of transiters if they do not join a coalition with
a complementary producer. Thus, for example, the first line of the table
characterizes the situation where Russia and Turkmenistan form singleton
coalitions. The second line presents the case in which Russia alone competes
with the coalition formed by the Caspian players. The third line considers
what would happen if Russia and Turkmenistan cooperate, while all the
transiters remain separate.
The next seven columns, that follow the partition column, show the pipelines
and investment options available to coalitions. We use the sign "-" to mark
the pipelines, which can not be used or invested in under the given partition.
If a particular pipeline option is available, but a coalition decides not to
realize it, we write "0" in a corresponding cell. We distinguish the pipelines
and options, which require the presence of Russia and Turkmenistan in a
coalition to be used. The first five columns indicate the pipelines for which
Russia is an essential player. To build TCP and Nabucco a coalition must
include Turkmenistan.
In the last three columns of the table we report the price and coalitional
payoffs in absolute and relative figures. The relative values are given com-
pared to the profit of the grand coalition {N}. In the following discussion
we mainly focus on the relative figures, since the absolute profits are sen-
sitive to our quantitative assumptions. In contrast, the relative results are
fairly robust, because a change of demand and supply parameters affects all
coalitions in a similar way.
5We assume that Poland, as a member of the EU, can not obstruct the supply through
Yamal pipeline. Therefore we do not include it into the list of players.
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In the "all options" variant, Russia, being alone, may invest in North Euro-
pean Gas Pipeline. As long as Turkmenistan does not form a competing sup-
ply chain, Russia will build the 74bcm/a pipeline through the Baltic sea and
obtain a profit of 4.6$bn or 57% of the profit of the grand coalition. In co-
operation with Ukraine, under the partition {{r, u}, {t}..}, Russia will forgo
investment in expensive NEGP. Instead it will upgrade the old Ukrainian
system increasing the transport capacity to 85bcm/a. As a result the coali-
tion of Russia and Ukraine will earn 6.5$bn. Hence, one additional player
will give Russia a 23% increase in relative profit. If Russia cooperates with
Belarus, it will use the existing capacities of Yamal 1 and install additional
52bcm/a of Yamal2. With the total capacity of 80bcm/a the coalition will
earn 5.8$bn yielding 72% of the profit of the grand coalition. Altogether,
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus will use the capacities of Ukold and Yamal1
to supply 90bcm/a of gas to the European market and achieve a relative
payoff of 82%. Thus, the second transit option increases the total profit less
than the first.
If Turkmenistan joins the coalition of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, its worth
will increase by 18 percentage points. Hence, the profit of the grand coali-
tion can be achieved by four major players even without Azerbaijan and
Iran. Turkmenistan will also increase the relative payoffs of coalitions {r, b}
and {r, u} by over 10 percentage points. However, the contribution of Turk-
menistan to the coalition of {a, i} is more than three times greater under
all the partitions. If Turkmenistan forms a competing coalition with the
Caspian transiters, the profit of a coalition organized by Russia will drop.
Thus, the competition with the Caspian players will reduce the profit of
{r, b, u} by a third down to become only 59% of that of the grand coalition.
In this case, the cooperation with Turkmenistan will increase the worth of
coalition {r, b, u} by almost 70 per cent to 40 percentage points.
The situation is quite different in the status quo case, when we do not allow
for the extension of the network. Russia on its own can not supply its gas
and will earn nothing. Only in cooperation with Ukraine or Belarus, or
both, can it transport its gas to the market and earn profit. By including
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the two transiters, Russia will increase its profit by 82 percentage points.
This is large compared to a 25 percentage points increase under the "all
options" variant. Turkmenistan even in cooperation with Azerbaijan and
Iran will have a zero profit. The Caspian producer will contribute only to
a coalition including Russia and at least one transiter, Ukraine or Belarus.
Turkmenistan will increase the profit of the three major players {r, b, u}
again by 18 percentage points, but this time it will have no other options to
generate profit.
3.3.2 Strategic value of pipelines
Now we proceed with the analysis of the balance of bargaining power and
strategic value of investment options. Based on the values of the partition
function we find equilibrium coalition structures and the players’ expected
payoffs. In addition, we calculate a relative share of a player in the profit
of the grand coalition. We interpret this share as the relative bargaining
power of the player. The results of our computations are presented in table
3.2. The table consists of two parts presenting the two perspectives on
bargaining: shortsighted and farsighted.
The upper part of the table, starting with the "status quo" variant, corre-
sponds to a shortsighted view on the balance of power in the network. In this
variant only the existing capacities of Ukold and Yamal 1 matter. Therefore,
under the shortsighted view Russia forfeits almost half its gas export profits
to the transiters. The sharing of the profit between the transiters reflects
their unequal capacities. Ukraine has more than twice as much capacity as
Belarus and obtains a three times greater share of profit.
In contrast, in a long-term perspective, the farsighted view, the players may
build any pipeline. Hence, all options to extend the network are to be taken
into account. In the lower part of the table we show the results of bargaining
when all investment options are available. The picture changes significantly.
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In the "all options" variant the producers gain almost 20 percentage points in
power and increase their power by a third. At the same time, the transiters
lose their advantage in a competition for transport services. Altogether they
are left with only 22% of the profit of the grand coalition.
The comparison of "status quo" and "all options" variants reveals the impact
of investment options on bargaining. To single out the value of a particular
investment option, we examine how the relative shares of the members of
the Eurasian gas supply network change with the availability of pipeline
options. In the upper part we look at how the bargaining power changes if
an investment option is added to "status quo". For example, after Russia and
Germany agreed on building NEGP, Russia used this option as a bargaining
chip in negotiations with Ukraine and Belarus. Thus, the project affects the
power structure, although the capacities will not be installed until 2010. In
the lower part of the table we consider the effect of removal of an investment
option from the portfolio of options. Adding or withdrawing options is first
of all a theoretical exercise to understand the strategic relevance of the
different pipelines. It may, however, have a practical interpretation as well.
For instance, an armistice in Georgia or Azerbaijan may prevent the TCP
project from being implemented. If relations with Iran strain further, the
Nabucco project may become politically unfeasible. The hold-up problem
with Ukraine or Belarus, may induce Russia to back away from Upgrade
and Yamal2 projects.
Considering various conjectures, we construct table 3.2. We use the name
of the variant to indicate which investment option is added or withdrawn
from the consideration. We compare "+" and "-" option variants to infer the
significance of the investment option. In what follows we proceed with the
analysis of our results.
Upgrade is the most efficient investment option and may increase the net-
work capacity by 15bcm/a. Comparing the figures in the "+ Upgrade" and
the "status quo" columns one can see that the option brings a slight shift in
the profit sharing. Ukraine strengthens its bargaining position by less than
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one point. The option hardly affects the position of Russia, who strength-
ens its position by 1% at the expense of Belarus. The strategic role of the
Upgrade is also negligible in the context of all the other options. The change
in the power structure between "- Upgrade" and "all" is negligible, the option
does not change the bargaining power of players except for Belarus. The rel-
ative shares of Russia and Ukraine decrease by less than 1%. The positions
of other players remain unaffected. Hence, we can conclude that Upgrade
turns out to be of no strategic importance to the players of the network.
The strategic role of the Yamal2 project is more vivid. If the option is added
to status quo, it strengthens the bargaining position of Belarus and Russia.
Ukraine loses 13 percentage points, while Belarus enjoys a 6 point increase in
shares. The increased substitutability between the transiters confers Russia
6 points profit. However, the strategic value of the option decreases if it is
considered in the context of all the options. With Yamal 2 available, Russia
and Belarus gain 1 percentage point at the cost of Ukraine. To sum up,
the investment option along Yamal has a small impact in the long-run and
gives moderate strategic advantage to Belarus and Russia in the short-run
perspective. This may explain the little interest of Russia in the track.
In contrast, the North European Gas pipeline changes the bargaining situa-
tion dramatically, from both the shortsighted and farsighted points of view.
The pipeline is the most expensive of all. By our conservative estimate, it is
about four times more expensive than the renovation of the Ukrainian sys-
tem and it has long been considered to be commercially inefficient. However,
it allows Russia to bypass its transiters and hence, damages the bargaining
positions of the transiters. In comparison with "status quo" Russia increases
its share in the profit by half, the share of Ukraine and Belarus is reduced
to a third. Together the transiters will obtain 14% instead of 41% if NEGP
is included. The great impact of NEGP on the balance of bargaining power
can also be observed in the lower table. Once the option is added to the list
of investment opportunities, Russia gains 1.5$bn or 17 percentage points
in bargaining power. NEGP gives Russia a great strategic advantage in
bargaining. This explains why Russia considers the pipeline as a highly
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beneficial project. The project, which seems to be commercially inefficient
in comparison with Upgrade and Yamal2, brings Russia more profit than
the other two projects together.
The options to increase transport capacities to supply Russian gas do not
have a significant impact on the shares of the Caspian players. Turkmenistan
has a weak bargaining position vis-a-vis Russia, as long as it cannot mar-
ket its gas directly. However, TCP and Nabucco allow the producer to
strengthen its position substantially. Like NEGP for Russia, the pipelines,
bypassing Russia and opening an access to the European market, are of
great strategic importance for Turkmenistan. Not surprisingly, the relative
power of Turkmenistan increases by 3 times compared to status quo, from
0,5$bn to 1.7$bn, when the two pipeline options are accounted for. The
threat of competition forces Russia to give up 15% of its total profit to
Turkmenistan. The prospect of competition reduces the value of the whole
supply chain including Ukraine and Belarus. The two transiters forfeit 14
points to newly emerged transiters - Azerbaijan and Iran. The strategic
value of the Caspian pipelines remains considerable also in the context of
"all" the options. Altogether the Caspian players gain 21 percentage points.
The advantage in bargaining yields the profit of 1.5$bn. This explains why
the Caspian players are so enthusiastic about the new pipelines, even though
the projects are costly. On the other hand, Russia loses almost 30% of its
profit, its share decreases from 80% to 58%. Therefore, Russia is interested
in preventing Turkmenistan from developing the alternative path.
3.3.3 Equilibrium partitions
For each variant introduced in table 3.2 we find the probability distribution
of equilibrium partitions. The game between the network players includes
only negative externalities, therefore, we expect the grand coalition to form.
Transiters tend to join a complementary producer, since he benefits from
their capacities at most. Supply chains are more profitable if integrated
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into one network, rather than competing against each other. Hence, the
producers have incentives to cooperate and form a monopoly. As a result,
in equilibrium the grand coalition is likely to form.
Looking at the equilibrium partitions predicted by the axioms (i)-(iv) we
also find the support for the formation of the grand coalition. The values
of the partition function confirm the efficiency of the grand coalition. The
profit of any coalition including both producers Sr ∪ St is higher, than the
sum of profit of coalitions Sr and St, when the producers stay separate. A
contribution of Ukraine and Belarus to coalition Sr is higher than to St. Let’s
consider the partition P = {{r}, {t, a, i}, ..}. If Belarus joins {t, a, i} Russia
loses 1.2$bn, while the Caspian players gain only 0.1$bn in "all options"
variant. Similarly, the contribution of Ukraine to a coalition of Russia is
1.4$bn vs. a zero increase in the profit of coalition {t, a, i}. Hence, according
to axiom (ii) the transiters will join Russia. The possibility to build TCP
and Nabucco is the most valuable for Turkmenistan. Under partition P =
{{r}, {t}, ..} Turkmenistan will achieve the profit of 3.1$bn with Azerbaijan
and Iran, whereas if the transiters join Russia their contribution will be
1.4$bn. As a result, Azerbaijan and Iran will join Turkmenistan. Similar
conclusions hold if Sr = {r, u} or {r, b}. The allocation of the Caspian
transiters has a greater impact on the coalition of Turkmenistan.
In the numerical calculations we find that the grand coalition forms with the
probability 1 in all the variants with some negligible exceptions. In some
orderings in variants "all minus one option", with the probability of less than
0.01 Azerbaijan and Iran stay separate. These orderings are such that the
Caspian transiters start the coalition formation process. In most of these
cases the formation of partitions {{a}, {r, t, b, u, i}}, {{i}, {r, t, b, u, a}}, and
{{a, i}, {r, t, b, u}} results from our tie-breaking rule. For the other cases, we
can explain the fact that Azerbaijan and Iran are left outside the coalition
as follows. According to the axioms by Maskin (2003), a player initiating a
coalition will obtain the cooperation surplus, while the players joining the
coalition after him receive only their opportunity payoff. In order to avoid
giving up a share in coalitional profit to players who come first but contribute
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nothing to the coalition finally formed, a follower may decide to start a new
coalition. The grand coalition will forego the expensive investments in TCP
and Nabucco projects. Therefore, the four major players {r, t, b, u} will start
a new coalition if they enter the game after a and/or i.
3.3.4 Robustness
As already mentioned, values of the partition function are sensitive to our
quantitative assumptions. As discussed in chapter 1 our estimations suffer
from the lack of data and uncertainty. Gas prices, to large extent, reflect
the movements in oil prices and may vary considerably during a period. The
demand for FSU gas also depends on the ability of European customers to
substitute it with the gas from other sources or with other sources of energy.
The question arises: how robust are our numerical results on bargaining
power to changes in our assumptions on demand parameters? We also note
that NEGP, TCP, and Nabucco options have the greatest impact on the
power structure. Would an increase in investment costs of these pipelines
have a strong effect effect on the bargaining power of the players?
To check the robustness of our results we examine three changes in our
assumptions: (i) a higher demand, (ii) a lower elasticity of demand, (iii)
higher investment costs.
We show how the results change in the "all options" case in table 3.3. We
consider a very substantial upward shift of demand increasing equilibrium
supply and required transport capacities by 45%. As a result, the grand
coalition will invest in additional 15bcm/a of Upgrade and 28bcm/a of Ya-
mal 2. We find that higher demand diminishes the role of the existing
capacities: Ukraine loses almost 50% of its relative power, the relative share
of Belarus decreases by about 25%. At the same time the bargaining power
of the producers increases: Russia gains 3 percentage points, the relative
power of Turkmenistan rises by a third. The considerable change in the
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bargaining power of Ukraine and Turkmenistan reveals some sensitivity of
our results to demand parameters.
A decrease of elasticity changes the power structure, but not significantly.
Low elasticity demand compensates high costs of bypass options and strength-
ens the bargaining position of the producers. Turkmenistan obtains a share
by 16% larger than in our original variant. The bargaining power of Russia
changes by 1 percentage point. The relative share of Belarus and Ukraine
decrease by 25%. Altogether we find that the difference with our base line
results is minor.
Finally, we consider what happens if we increase investment costs of NEGP,
TCP, and Nabucco by 50%. Intuitively, the more expensive the bypass op-
tions are, the smaller the bargaining power of the producers and the greater
is the impact of existing pipelines. According to our calculations, Russia
and Turkmenistan lose about 10% of their relative share, while Ukraine and
Belarus almost double their shares. We conclude that a significant change
in investment costs will affect our results.
3.4 Empirical evidence
In general it is difficult to analyze real world problems using partition
function form games. The optimization problem of every conceivable sub–
coalition of players has to be solved and the number of possible coalitions
grows rapidly as the number of players increases. Many of the possible sub–
coalitions would have to deal with situations which are very different from
those prevailing in reality. This raises the problem of obtaining data and
making predictions for rather hypothetical situations, which severely limits
the practical applicability of the approach. Hence, the Eurasian gas supply
network provides us with a rather unique opportunity to apply game the-
ory. The number of truly independent players is small and the profits of the
various coalitions can be derived with a reasonable accuracy.
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In the paper we have demonstrated how bargaining power can be assessed.
We have shown the effect investment options have on the strategic positions
of the players. Nevertheless, it is difficult to relate our results to real world
data. These are scarce as many terms of contracts are confident. Besides,
given that the payoffs among players are sometimes made in kind or in the
form of political concessions, it would be incorrect to compare our figures
with profits, which countries obtain from gas export. Notwithstanding these
difficulties, we can provide some rough estimates, which suggest that our
model describes the situation quite well.
Currently, about 120bcm/a of gas is exported by Russia to Eastern and
Western Europe through Ukraine. For the transit services Ukraine obtains
a transit fee, which is about 20.2$/tcm and gas on a reduced price. Until
2005 Ukraine bought about 25bcm/a paying only a quarter of the prices
of Europe. In terms of the supply profit, this amounts to 15% of Russia’s
profits from export via Ukraine, which is 70bcm/a, or around 10% of the
total profit. Together with the transit fee this results in slightly less than
26% in total profit. In 2005, after Russia finally agreed to build NEGP in
cooperation with Germany, it renegotiated the terms of its export to Ukraine
and signed a new contract. According to the new deal, Ukraine had to pay
the price equal to a third of the European level prevailing at that time. This
weakened Ukraine’s position to 14%. At last, in 2006 Russia and Ukraine
signed a long-term contract, according to which the price increased to half of
that of Europe. The contract envisages a full market price by 2010. Hence,
at present Ukraine receives about 10% of the total export profit. Looking
at table 3.2 we see that there is a reasonably close correspondence between
the real changes in bargaining power of Ukraine and our results. Before the
building of NEGP was approved, the bargaining position of Ukraine can be
described by "status quo" variant. The current share of Ukraine coincides
with "+NEGP" scenario. Russia’s prospects to set the gas price for Ukraine
to the European level and hence, leave it slightly more than 6% of total
profit, corresponds to allocation of bargaining power in "all" scenario.
Russia has also asked a price increase for its export to Belarus. After contin-
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uous negotiations, Belarus has recently given up to Russian demands under
the treat of being cut off. Now instead of one fourth, the transiter pays a
half of the European prices. In total this counts for a decrease in the total
profit share of Belarus from 12% to 3%. This change can be associated with
the shift from "+Yamal2" variant to "+NEGP" or "all" scenario.
Unfortunately, we can not say much about payoffs of the Caspian transiters.
Some information is available only on a payoff to Turkmenistan. Soon after
tentative agreements have been signed and negotiations about a financial
support of the TCP and Nabucco projects with the USA and EU have been
initiated, Russia doubled its payments to Turkmenistan for gas. Now Russia
pays for Turkmen gas half of the European prices. Only one year ago it paid
less than a third. It is difficult to separate how much of the gas bought from
Turkmenistan Russia actually sells to Europe. The estimates range from
10bcm/a to 20bcm/a. In addition Russia buys gas to deliver it as a transit
payment to Ukraine. Altogether the final payment for Turkmenistan in the
past was about 5%, which roughly coincides with its share in the "status
quo" variant. However, under the new contract, in which Russia agreed to
double the price for Turkmen gas and increased its import, the bargaining
position of Turkmenistan improved. The new share of the Caspian producer
can be estimated around 10% to 12%. Hence, we again observe a transition
in the direction of the "all options" variant.
We conclude that our model allows to explain developments in the Eurasian
gas supply network quite well. Our results are correct by order of magnitude
and reflect the trend by direction. Apparently, a shortsighted view on a
bargaining power changes only after an option has been formally approved
and the project is close to realization. The short-term agreements seem
to reflect the existing capacities only, whereas terms of long-term contracts
reflect a farsighted view.
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Table 3.1: Production plans, prices, and profits
all options
partition capacity on pipelines bcm/a price profit % of total
Uold Yam1 Yam2 Uup NEGP TCP Nab $/tcm $bn
{{r}, {t}, ..} - - - - 74 - - 145 4.6 57%
{{r}, {t, a, i}, ..} - - - - 61 30 30 129 3.2; 3.0 39%; 37%
{{r, t}, ..} - - - - 89 - - 142 5.7 71%
{{r, b}, {t}..} - 28 52 - 0 - - 143 5.8 1 72%
{{r, b}, {t, a, i}..} - 28 38 - 0 30 30 125 4.0; 3.1 50%; 38%
{{r, t, b}, ..} - 28 68 - 0 - - 136 7.0 87%
{{r, u}, {t}..} 70 - - 15 0 - - 141 6.5 81%
{{r, u}, {t, a, i}..} 70 - - 0 0 30 30 124 4.6; 3.0 57%; 37%
{{r, t, u}, ..} 70 - - 15 6 - - 139 7.7 92%
{{r, b, u}, {t}..} 70 20 0 0 0 - - 141 6.6 82%
{{r, b, u}, {t, a, i}..} 70 5 0 0 0 30 30 121 4.7; 2.9 59%; 30%
{N} 70 28 0 0 0 0 0 135 8.1 100%
status quo
{{r, u}, {t, a, i}..} 70 - - - - - - 147 6.3 79%
{{r, t, u}, ..} 70 - - - - - - 147 7.2 90%
{{r, b}, {t, a, i}..} - 28 - - - - - 164 3.5 44%
{{r, t, b}, ..} - 28 - - - - - 164 3.7 46%
{{r, b, u}, {t, a, i}..} 70 20 - - - - - 139 6.6 82%
{N} 70 28 - - - - - 135 8.1 100%
a The demand function p(q)=175 - 0.4q and the production cost of Russia acr(q)=25+0.4q and
of Turkmenistan act(q)=20+0.3q are chosen as to make existing capacities 70bcm/a of Ukold
and 28bcm/a of Yamal1 be optimal.
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Table 3.2: Payoffs in $bn and bargaining power w.r.t. availability of pipelines
status quo + Upgrade + Yamal2 + NEGP + TCP + TCP&Nab
Russia 4.3 53% 4.4 54% 4.8 59% 6.3 78% 3.5 43% 3.0 37%
Turkmenistan 0.5 6% 0.5 6% 0.5 7% 0.6 8% 1.2 15% 1.7 21%
Ukraine 2.4 31% 2.5 31% 1.5 18% 0.8 10% 1.9 24% 1.6 20%
Belarus 0.8 10% 0.7 9% 1.3 16% 0.3 4% 0.7 9% 0.7 8%
Azerbaijan 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.7 9% 0.5 7%
Iran 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.5 7%
all options - Upgrade - Yamal2 - NEGP - TCP - TCP&Nab
Russia 4.7 58% 4.7 58% 4.6 57% 3.3 41% 5.4 67% 6.5 80%
Turkmenistan 1.6 19% 1.5 19% 1.5 19% 1.7 21% 1.1 14% 0.7 8%
Ukraine 0.7 8% 0.6 8% 0.9 10% 1.2 15% 0.7 8% 0.7 8%
Belarus 0.3 4% 0.4 5% 0.2 3% 0.9 11% 0.3 4% 0.3 4%
Azerbaijan 0.4 5% 0.4 5% 0.4 5% 0.5 6% 0.5 7% 0 0%
Iran 0.4 5% 0.4 5% 0.4 5% 0.5 6% 0 0% 0 0%
Table 3.3: Robustness
original high low high
varianta demandb elasticityc costsd
Russia 58% 61% 59% 56%
Turkmenistan 19% 25% 22% 15%
Ukraine 8% 4% 6% 14%
Belarus 4% 3% 3% 6%
Azerbaijan 5% 4% 5% 4%
Iran 5% 4% 5% 4%
a p(q)=175 - 0.4q acr(q)=25+0.4q act(q)=20+0.35q (100)=-3.4
b p(q)=250 - 0.4q (100)=-5.2
c p(q)=190 - 0.55q (100)=-2.4
d investment costs of NEGP, TCP, Nabucco are increased by 50%
Chapter 4
Coalition formation,
commitment, and strategic
investments
4.1 Introduction
In 2005 Russia started to build the North European Gas Pipeline, the first
direct pipeline to Europe and the most expensive one of all. Why has Russia
forgone cheaper investment options? Similarly, over the last five years Turk-
menistan and other Caspian countries have considered expensive pipelines,
Trans-Caspian and Nabucco, to reach European markets bypassing Russia.
Although little progress has been made, the projects are continuously dis-
cussed in the press. Why do the Caspian players keep these options? Are
they actually going to realize them?
In this chapter we develop a model to answer these two questions. We build
a framework to analyze multinational relations and understand distortion of
investments in the Eurasian gas supply network. We continue the analysis
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provided in chapter 2 and 3. Like in chapter 2 we consider how the hold-
up problem may affect investments in pipelines. We again assume that the
players are heterogenous in their ability to make long-term commitments and
are prone to renegotiate ex post. As in chapter 3 we include the Caspian
Republics into the list of network players. Hence, in contrast to the model in
chapter 2, competing supply chains may be formed resulting in externalities
across coalition. Therefore, we have to extend the framework developed in
the previous chapter to allow for externalities and the hold-up problem.
As in chapter 2 we use a two stage model to represent the hold-up problem.
At the first stage players form coalitions to invest and bargain over invest-
ment and profit sharing. At the second stage investment costs are sunk,
players cooperate or compete to supply gas to the market. We assume that
supply coalitions formed at the second stage compete in prices given the
capacities installed at the first period. Reliable players can commit not to
renegotiate the agreement of the first stage. Unreliable players cooperate
at the first stage to attract investments, but will renegotiate at the second
stage to get a higher share of profit.
On each stage we have to solve a game of coalition formation and bargaining
similar to the one presented in section 3.2. We again represent a game in
"partition function form" and solve it using the solution concept of Maskin
(2003). In the quantitative part we follow the assumptions presented in sec-
tion 1.2 and numerically solve for equilibrium coalition structures, expected
payoffs of the players, and investments. We consider three scenarios, which
vary in the assumptions on the players’ ability to commit. As a benchmark
case we take the situation in which all the players can credibly commit.
The resulting first best investment would maximize the profit of the whole
network. The second scenario describes the situation where only produc-
ers, Russia and Turkmenistan, can commit, while transiters are prone to
recontract. In the third scenario none of players can commit.
We find, that the hold-up problem leads to overinvestment, as well as un-
derinvestment, and "undercooperation". Underinvestment occurs when in-
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vestment in a cost efficient pipeline weakens the bargaining position of a
producer too much. Overinvestment occurs when investment in expensive
pipelines, while reducing overall profits, yields a large enough gain in bar-
gaining power. In other words, players increase capacities to strengthen
their bargaining position vis-a-vis unreliable partners. By undercooperation
we mean a more splintered coalition structure compared to the one which
would prevail if all the players can commit.
It turns out that the ability to commit to long-term profit sharing is of an
overriding importance and diminishes the role of investment cost. In the
second scenario, when the transiters cannot commit, the producers cooper-
ate at the investment stage and invest in expensive direct pipelines. The
resulting overcapacity is justified by a bargaining advantage of the produc-
ers at the second stage. Yet if we assume that the producers were also not
able to commit, competing supply coalitions form. The Caspian producers
would build the pipelines bypassing Russia, in spite of the assumed unreli-
ability of the Caspian transiters. Russia would still build the direct Baltic
pipeline. The lack of commitment would substantially reduce the profit of
the network.
Among other works mentioned in the previous chapters, the analysis of this
chapter relates to the investigation by Harbaugh [2001]. Harbaugh [2001]
studies effects of the hold-up problem on investments of firms organized in
coalitions by equity stakes. He considers two firms, a target firm and a
shareholder firm. First, a target firms sells rights on its profit, then both
firms can make investments affecting both sides’ profitability and finally the
two firms bargain over the division of the joint profits. Examining the ex
post bargaining between firms, Harbaugh (2001) finds, similar to Janeba
[2000], that the commitment problem may result in underinvestment and
overinvestment as the firms attempt to improve their bargaining positions.
Although the framework of Harbaugh [2001] is somewhat similar to ours, his
model is constructed for the two player case, whereas we present a solution
suitable for any number of players.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
a formal modal. In Section 3 we consider the results and suggest their
interpretation. Section 4 concludes.
4.2 The model
4.2.1 Basic notions
To analyze the investment problem we use a two stage model. We consider
a set of players N = {.., i, ..} consisting of producers and transiters cooper-
ating to sell gas. Gas is transported through pipelines. Before trade takes
place the players set up capacities by investing in pipelines. Players may
form coalitions to invest cooperatively. By the time of supply, investment
costs are sunk and capacities generate quasi-rents. Before implementing the
investments, members of coalitions sign long-term contracts specifying how
expected rents are to be shared. We assume that some players may be not
able to credibly commit to such contracts and may renegotiate payoffs ex
post. Hence, the "hold-up" problem may arise. As a result, only credible
players will cooperate to invest.
In detail the game unfolds as follows. At the first stage, marked with the
superscript I, players form "investment coalitions" SI . The set of coalitions
P I = {.., SIk , ..} is referred to as a partition, or a coalition structure.1 In view
of the hold-up problem we limit the set of possible coalition structures by
allowing only the set of credible players N c to form coalitions. The players,
who cannot credibly commit N \ N c, play as singletons. We denote the
new set of partitions formed within this restriction as ΠI . Note that ΠI is a
subset of the set PI of all possible coalition structures that can be formed by
1Here we will use the same partition function form approach and imply, the same
properties of the game as in the previous chapter. In particular, coalitions embedded in
any partition are pairwise disjoined Sk ∩ Sh = ∅ for all k 6= h and
⋃|P |
k=1 Sk = N , where
| · | denotes cardinality, e.g. |N | is the total number of players.
83
the players N . The two sets are equal if all the players can commit ΠI = PI
⇔ N = N c, if none of the players can commit N c = ∅ the only possible
partition is a set of singletons ΠI = {N}.
Each coalition SI ∈ ΠI invests in network capacities k∗(SI) to maximize
its future rent wI(SI ; ΠI). The rent depends on the total capacity of the
network and hence on the entire partition. Therefore, we use a partition
function for its representation. Members of SI bargain between themselves
over the rent sharing and fix the payoffs ψI = (.., ψIi , ..) with long-term
contracts. Overall, at the first stage the coalition formation and bargaining
game is given by (N,N c, wI). The solution of this game is a vector of ex-
pected payoffs E[ψI ] and a probability distribution of equilibrium partitions
p(ΠI).
At the second or "supply" stage, investment costs are sunk, the network
capacities k∗ = ∑SI∈ΠI k∗(SI) are fixed and players form coalitions S and
supply to the market. We use the superscript S to label the variables of the
second stage.2 At this stage the set of players is represented by coalitions
ΠI formed at the previous stage of our model. In other words each coalition
SI acts as a single player. We denote the coalition structure at the second
stage as PS . Newly formed coalitions S compete on the market setting
prices pS and quantities qS . The market equilibrium depends on the set
of suppliers PS and profits, which are again given by a partition function
wS : (S;PS) → R. Within coalitions players bargain over sharing of the
supply profits. The outcome vector of payoffs ψS = (.., ψS
SI
, ..) determines
the rents of the first stage coalitions. In short, the second stage is described
by the game in partition function form (ΠI , wS). The outcome of the game
is the pair (E[ψS ], p(PS)) - the vector of expected payoffs and probability
distribution of coalition structures.
By its structure, our two stage game is similar to a composite game devel-
2However, to avoid cumbersome notations we will denote coalitions formed at this stage
as S instead SS .
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oped by Owen [1977]. Owen [1977] modeled a game, in which players form
’a priory’ coalitions to gain an advantage in subsequent bargaining, where
these coalitions act as units. He defined the expected payoff of a player as
an outcome of the bargaining over sharing of the expected profit of an ’a
priory’ coalition, which the player joins. The approach of Owen [1977] is
based on the Shapley value and hence, does not allow for externalities. We
extend the framework of Owen [1977] to games with externalities by using
the solution concept of Maskin [2003].
To solve the investment problem, we have to solve the game at the first
stage (N,N c, wI). To this end, we must calculate the values of the partition
function wI . By analogy with the approach of Owen [1977], we work out
the game backwards and first solve the bargaining game at the second stage
(ΠI , wS) for all possible equilibrium partitions of the first stage ΠI . We have
described the approach in chapter 3 and in what follows we assume that we
know how to find (E[ψI ], p(ΠI)) and (E[ψS ], p(PS)) once the values of the
partition functions are given. We proceed with the model backwards and
start with the supply stage.
4.2.2 The second stage
At the second stage the capacities of the network k∗ = {k∗l }l∈L for L =
{NEGP , Ukold, Upgrade, Y amal1, Y amal2, TCP , Nabucco} are fixed.
By forming a coalition players combine their resources. We denote the ca-
pacities that a coalition has at its disposal by k∗(S).3 The available capaci-
ties constrain supply: qS ≤ k∗(S). In order to be able to supply a coalition
must include at least one producer. In our case, we have only two producers,
so that at most two supply coalitions can form. We assume coalitions com-
pete in prices and use the insight of Kreps, Scheinkman (1983) to analyze
3Capacities available to a coalition are the pipelines running through the territories of
the coalition members. For instance, Russia controls NEGP k∗({r}) = {k∗NEGP }, Ukraine
- Ukold and Upgrade k∗({u}) = {k∗Ukold, k∗Ukold}.
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the price competition under capacity constraints. Each coalition sets a price
and serves demand up to available capacities:
qS =

min[ k∗(S),max[0, D(pS)− k∗(S′)] ], pS > pS′
min[k∗(S), D(pS)], pS < pS′
min[k∗(S),max[D(pS)2 , D(pS)− k∗(S
′)] ], pS = pS′
(4.1)
here D(p) is the demand function and S and S′ are the competing coalitions.
The coalition, which sets a lower price, supplies first, high price coalition
faces residual demand. Following Kreps and Scheinkman [1983] we assume
the efficient rationing of demand. If the prices are the same, competing
coalitions share the demand equally. If both producers are in the same
coalition, they form monopoly. As a result, coalitions obtain a net profit
pi(S; k∗(S), k∗(S′); pS , pS′ ) = pSqS − tc(qS), where tc(·) is the total cost of
supply.
According to Lemmas 2 to 6 in Kreps and Scheinkman [1983] there can be
a pure strategy and a mixed strategy equilibrium. The former occurs when
the total capacity is in the Cournot region, that is smaller than the opti-
mal Cournot response: r(k∗(S′)) = argmaxk∗(S) p(k∗(S) + k∗(S
′))k∗(S) −
tc(k∗(S)) ≥ k∗(S). In this case, coalitions earn Cournot profits. If k∗(S) >
k∗(S′) and k∗(S) ≥ r(k∗(S′)) there is a mixed strategy equilibrium, and
the expected profit of a larger (in terms of capacity) coalition is equal to
pi∗(S; k∗) = p(r(k(S′)) + k(S′))r(k(S′)) − tc(r(k(S′))). The coalition with
smaller capacities earns the expected profit of k(S′)/k(S) · pi∗(S; k∗).4 The
equilibrium profits determine the values of the partition function:
wS(SS ;PS) = pi∗(S; k∗) (4.2)
For coalitions consisting of transiters only we have wS(SS ;PS) = 0.
Calculating the values of the partition function for all possible PS , we ob-
tain a full description of the game of the second stage, and can solve for
the equilibrium (E[ψS ], p(PS)). Since the values of the partition function
4For more detail see Kreps and Scheinkman [1983].
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depend on capacities, the outcome of the game also depends on k∗. To make
this relation explicit we write E[ψS(k∗)] and p(PS(k∗)). Now we proceed
with the first stage at which the capacities are chosen.
4.2.3 The first stage
At this stage players form coalitions and agree on a long-term rent sharing.
Recall that by assumption some players can not commit and will recontract.
As a result, only credible players can cooperate in coalitions, whereas the
others will act as singletons. Anticipating their future payoff E[ψS
SI
(k∗)]
members of coalitions SI invest as to maximize:
pi∗(SI ; ΠI) = max
k(SI)
E[ψSSI (k
o + k(SI) + k(ΠI \ SI))]− I(k(SI)) (4.3)
here ko is the initial capacities of the network.5 Coalitions choose invest-
ments k∗(SI) taking into account the decisions of the outsiders k∗(ΠI \SI).
To find the Nash equilibrium SI for a given partition ΠI we solve the op-
timization problem (4.3) simultaneously for all coalitions embedded in ΠI .
Repeating the procedure for all feasible ΠI we define the partition function:
wI(SI ; ΠI) = pi∗(SI ; ΠI) (4.4)
Finally, applying Maskin’s (2003) approach we determine how rents are
shared within coalitions to find (E[ψI ], p(P I)). For the players who can
not commit E[ψIi ] = E[ψSi (k∗)]−I(k({i})). In essence we obtain our results
applying a procedure similar to the one proposed by Owen [1977], but use
Maskin [2003] solution instead of the Shapley value.
5Since a coalition can invest in any pipeline in the network, in contrast to k∗(S), the
vector k∗(SI) can include capacities which are not under the control of i ∈ SI at the
second stage.
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4.3 Results
For the calibration of the model we use assumptions on demand and supply
motivated in chapter 1. As we are interested in the implication for cur-
rent investment planning, we look at into the future and choose the high
demand and high supply cost scenario to evaluate the partition functions
wI , wS . From these we calculate the equilibrium coalition structures and
the expected payoffs at the first and second stages. Finally, we solve for the
equilibrium investments and find the resulting supply quantities.6 We make
these calculations for three scenarios, varying the assumption on who can
commit to long-term profit sharing. The first scenario is a benchmark case,
in which we assume, that all players can commit. In this case the hold-up
problem does not arise and the first best strategy is chosen. We call this
scenario accordingly - "first best". In the second scenario, titled "{r, t}", we
assume that only Russia and Turkmenistan have the ability to make cred-
ible long-term commitments, while the transiters are prone to renegotiate
their payoffs, after capacities are in place. Our third scenario, labeled "{∅}",
reflects the situation, in which none of the players can commit. Table 4.1
and Table 4.2 present the results.
For the first scenario we obtain that in equilibrium the grand coalition
will be formed with a probability of 0.91 at the investment stage P I =
{N}. With a probability of 0.09 two competing coalitions will form P I =
{{r, b, u}, {t, a, i}}.7 The grand coalition chooses capacities so as to maxi-
mize the network profit and install the pipelines with the lowest capacity
costs. As it is shown in the first row of figures in Table 4.1, the players will
invest in 15 bcm/a of Upgrade and 28 bcm/a of Yamal2. With 43 bcm/a of
extra capacity, the total capacity of the network is 141 bcm/a which is equal
to the profit maximizing supply quantity. Deducting annual investment cost
in the amount of $0.5bn, the players obtain a net profit of $16.3bn. This
6Calculations are performed with Mathematica 5.1 program. Files with results are
available upon request.
7With the probability less than 1% Azerbaijan and Iran will be left outside the coalition.
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Table 4.1: Equilibrium investments, quantities, profits
scenario extra capacitya [bcm/a]
∑
S
qS ‖
∑
l
k¯l
∑
l
Il net profitb
NEGP TCP Nab Uup Yam [bcm/a] $bn $bn
first bestc 0 0 0 15 28 141 ‖ 141 0.5 16.3
{r, t} 105 0 0 0 0 141 ‖ 203 2.6 14.0
{∅} 87 30 30 0 0 141 ‖ 245 3.6 12.9
a Besides, there are two existing pipelines kUkold =70bcm/a and kY amal1 =28bcm/a
b for demand p(q)=250-0.4q and supply costs acr=40+0.4q and act=30+0.35q
c when the grand coalition forms
Table 4.2: Expected payoffs in $mln
first bestc {r, t} {∅}
ψI ψ˜S ψI ψ˜S ψI ψS
Russia 10.2 8.6 10.0 12.7 8.6 10.8
Turkmenistan 3.5 1.0 3.4 1.4 2.1 3.5
Ukraine 0.8 4.0 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.2
Belarus 0.6 2.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2
Azerbaijan 0.7 0 0 0 0.9 0.9
Iran 0.7 0 0 0 0.9 0.9
profit is shared among the players according to ψI as given in the second
column of Table 4.2. If competing supply chains form, the coalition {r, b, u}
will invest in Upgrade and add 10bcm/a. The Caspian players will build
both TCP and Nabucco with total capacities of 60bcm/a. However, at the
second stage the grand coalition forms and the players use the capacities
installed at the first stage efficiently and supply 141bcm/a. In the next sub-
section we will look in more detail why competing supply chains may form
although players can commit.
To justify our next scenario, consider a thought experiment on what would
happen if the players renegotiate after the capacities are installed. The sec-
ond column of table 9, entitled ψ˜S , presents the result of such an imaginary
ex post bargaining. One can see, that Ukraine and Belarus would bene-
fit a lot from recontracting, since the additional capacities strengthen their
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bargaining position and enable them to extract more rent. Hence, in the
absence of international institutions, which would enforce investment con-
tracts, renegotiations are to be expected. This leads us to the next scenario.
4.3.1 Hold-up and distortions
Assuming that the transiters can not commit we obtain that at the first stage
the partition P I = {{r, t}, {a}, {b}, {i}, {u}} will form with probability 1.
As the second row of Table 4.1 shows, the producers will not implement
Upgrade and Yamal 2, but will invest in the direct offshore pipeline. The
North European Gas Pipeline will be built with a capacity of 105 bcm/a.
At the supply stage the grand coalition will form, with the probability 0.99,
and the optimal supply quantities will again be 141 bcm/a. As a result,
62bcm/a of new capacity will be left idle. With total investment cost of
$2.6bn, the net network profit will be $14.0bn, that is much less than in the
first best case.
As in chapter 2 the hold-up problem leads not only to underinvestment as
commonly predicted, but also to overinvestment and excess capacities. The
producers underinvest in cheap options in Ukraine and Belarus, and overin-
vest in NEGP. These "strategic distortions" of investments reflect the efforts
of the producers to strengthen their bargaining position and gain leverage
vis-a-vis unreliable transiters. NEGP will allow the producers to bypass
all the transiters and hence, will grant them a great strategic advantage in
bargaining.
To motivate the third scenario, we look at what would happen if the pro-
ducers fall apart and recontract ex post. The fourth column in Table 4.2
gives the expected payoffs of the players in this situation. Since ψIr < ψ˜Sr
we conclude, that now it is Russia who has incentives to renege on the
agreement.
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This leads us to the scenario "{∅}" in which no player can commit. As the
last row in Table 4.1 shows, in equilibrium NEGP, TCP, and Nabucco will be
built with the capacity of 87 bcm/a, 30 bcm/a, and 30 bcm/a, respectively.
We find that the players will form the grand coalition at the supply stage,
with a probability of about 0.85. With a probability 15% two competing
coalitions {r, b, u} and {t, a, i} will form. Columns five and six report the
expected payoffs of the players. We obtain that in equilibrium only Russia
and Turkmenistan will invest. Therefore, the expected payoffs at the supply
and investment stages are the same for the transiters, while the payoffs of
Russia and Turkmenistan are reduced at the investment stage by investment
costs.
In the third scenario we again observe strategic distortions of investments,
including underinvestment, overinvestment, and excess capacity. If the
grand coalition forms at the supply stage, more than half of the new ca-
pacities will not be used. If the Caspian players form a separate coalition,
capacities of TCP and Nabucco will be fully used to compete with Russian
supply. Two thirds of the capacities along the Baltic sea will be left idle.
Hence, the more players are not able to commit, the larger overinvestments
are and the less likely the grand coalition be formed.
Considering the aggregate network profits given in the last column of Ta-
ble 4.1 we evaluate the costs of the lack of commitment. The inability of
transiters to commit to long-term rent sharing results in the loss of $2.3bn,
as the investment costs soar by almost three times, from $0.5bn to $2.6bn.
Altogether, the lack of commitment, combined with the absence of any en-
forcement institution leads to the waste of over $3.1bn annually.
4.3.2 Formation of competing coalitions
As we have mentioned above, under "all can commit" scenario, compet-
ing coalitions may form. Now we look at this phenomenon in more de-
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tail. First, note that the probability 0.09 means, that the partition P ∗ =
{{t, a, i}, {r, b, u}} forms in 66 orders θ out of |N |! = 6!. We find that a
distinguishing feature of these orders is that Russia enters the game only
after all the Caspian players and Ukraine or Belarus have already arrived.
Here, for illustrative purpose we consider the order θ : (t, a, b, i, u, r). Al-
though the game is in fact solved backwards, we will discuss the moves in
the natural order.
Azerbaijan as a second players has to choose whether to join Turkmenistan
or start a new coalition. As we discussed in chapter 3, a transiter always
joins his complement producer, hence {t, a} forms. The next step, allocation
of Belarus, is a turning point of a game. If Belarus joins {t, a}, the grand
coalition will form, if the transiter starts a new coalition, then competing
coalitions form. Let’s assume that Belarus enters coalition {t, a}. By the
next step Iran will join Turkmenistan, without whom it can not use his
resources. Then Ukraine enters the game. We find that Ukraine will not
join {t, a, b, i}, because the worth of its resources is diminished by presence
of other transiters. Instead Ukraine will organize a new coalition, which
Russia joins on the next step. Russia will prefer to join Ukraine, because as
in the case of Ukraine, the value of its resources is smaller in the presence
of Turkmenistan. Even without Russia, Turkmenistan can supply its gas
via TCP and Nabucco, whereas the worth of a coalition of Ukraine without
Russia is zero. Hence, we calculate that Russia’s contribution to {u} is
larger than to {t, a, b, i}. To sum up, the partition {{r, u}, {t, a, b, i}} would
form, if Belarus enters the existing coalition.
Coming back to the question of the allocation of Belarus, we see that if it
joins {t, a}, its resources will be idle without Russia. Therefore, Belarus may
prefer to start a new coalition. In this case, the choice of Iran does not change
and {t, a, i} forms. When Ukraine enters the game, it will join Belarus. In
principle, it may start a new coalition {u} or join {t, a, i}. Russia will prefer
to follow Ukraine both in {{t, a, i}, {u}, {b}} in {{t, a, i, u}, {b}}. However,
neither of the two alternatives will give Ukraine a larger payoff, than in
the {b, u} case. Finally, Russia enters the game and joins the coalition of
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complement transiters forming P ∗ = {{t, a, i}, {r, b, u}}.
Similar reasoning is applied to ∅ scenario. Competing coalitions form at
108 orders at the supply stage. In these orders Russia, as in the example
discussed above, arrives after the Caspian players. Thus, we revealed that
the outcome of the game depends on the worth of resources of a player in
the presence of other members of the coalition.
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we developed a framework for the analysis of endogenous
coalition formation and multilateral bargaining in an environment with ex-
ternalities. We applied our study to analyze the Eurasian gas supply net-
work. Since there are no international institutions which could enforce con-
tracts between the countries involved in the network, we assumed that a
commitment problem may arise. Our calculations showed that the coun-
tries do be prone to hold-up in order to extract higher profits.
We looked at three different scenarios, varying the assumption on the play-
ers’ ability to commit. Our results support the assumption that investments
are mainly driven by strategic considerations and the desire to strengthen
the bargaining position. As in chapter 2 we find that the "hold-up" prob-
lem may lead to underinvestments as well as overinvestments and excess
capacities. The players underinvest in capacities of unreliable parties and
overinvest in capacities which strengthen their bargaining position.
Applying the model to the Eurasian gas supply network we succeeded in
providing a rational for observed investment patterns. We find that the
ability to commit prevails over investment costs. In our analysis we obtain
that whenever there is a possibility that Ukraine and Belarus will recontract,
the North European Gas Pipeline will be built. The disputes between Russia
and Ukraine and Belarus questioned the credibility of these countries and
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led to strategic distortions in investments: underinvestments in the upgrade
of the Ukrainian system and the Yamal 2 pipeline. Both projects have
been abandoned in favor of the expensive Baltic pipeline. The fact that
investment in NEGP is under its way confirms our results. However, as to
the amount for overinvestment our predictions appear to be too large. This
result can be explained by the static nature of our model.8 Recall that in
our study we assume that the countries can invest, and hence, change their
bargaining position, only once.
Furthermore, according to our results, the larger the number of players who
can not commit, the larger is the overinvestment. If none of the players
can commit, NEGP, TCP, and Nabucco will be built. This finding also
corresponds with reality. When relations between Turkmenistan and Russia
were bad, Turkmenistan worked out projects to bypass Russia. It signed a
series of tentative agreements with the potential transiters, namely Turkey,
Azerbaijan, and Iran, and even started to build sections of TCP in Georgia
with massive support of the USA. However, after Russia has made price
concessions and agreed to transit Turkmen gas, Turkmenistan slowed down
the realization of its plans. Our calculations suggest that the only way to
prevent TCP and Nabucco if Russia credibly commits to transit Turkmen
gas. Otherwise, the Caspian producers will build the pipelines bypassing
Russia, in spite of all the difficulties, if Russia does not prove its ability to
commit.
tex
8 See Hubert and Suleymanova [2006] for more details.
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Appendix A
In this section we describe the procedure used to estimate the demand for
FSU gas. As mentioned in chapter 1 we derive the residual demand function
based on European gas consumption data and on information on supply
quantities and costs of all European exporters. We take that consumption
of gas Q is exogenously given and use the figures from Petroleum [2003] and
International Gas Union Report (2006). The information on capacities and
marginal costs mc of all exporters are taken from de L’Energie [2002].
We obtain the import demand for gas in Western Europe by deducting from
the consumption of a corresponding year, quantities Qdom covered by domes-
tic production of the EU countries. The rest Qim = Q −Qdom is imported
from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) producers and "other" exporters. To
derive the residual demand for FSU gas we assume that a reduction of supply
from FSU would lead to an increase in supply from "other" sources q−FSU ,
rather than a change in total demand. Hence, the associated changes in
price are determined by the cost of the marginal supplier who replaces, or
is driven out by, FSU gas. Figure 2 illustrates the approach to estimation
of the demand function.
Suppose Russia supplies qFSU out of total Qim. According to the data
in Observatoire Mediteranen de L’Energie(2003), Nigeria LNG is the most
expensive non-FSU gas producer. It supplies about 5 bcm/a. The second
most expensive supplier is Oman with 1 bcm/a.
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Continuing down to the cheapest exporter, we end up with Algeria. If Russia
increased its supply it would squeeze out the most expensive competitor first,
the second most expensive exporter next and so on. Thus, we derive the
demand for FSU gas as qFSU = Qim − q−FSU (mc).
The gas market is not perfectly competitive and the price for gas includes
a substantial mark up on marginal cost. To obtain a realistic picture of the
price for FSU gas we inflate the marginal cost by a mark-up of 20%. Finally,
assuming a linear form of the inverse residual demand function, we estimate
the parameters of the demand for FSU gas. For all three time perspectives
we obtain price elasticities at equilibrium consumption around - 3.5. The
high elasticity of demand reflects the flexibility of the European buyers in
the choice of a producer. The obtained elasticity is close by its value to the
estimates for the European market provided in Boots et al. [2004].
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Figure 1: Estimating the demand for FSU gas.
Appendix B
In this section we prove proposition 4 providing an example of a superaddi-
tive game (N,w) in which the solution of Maskin (2003) does not result in
any equilibrium. We consider a game of four players N = {a, b, c, d}. Let the
players arrive to the game in the natural order θ: (a, b, c, d) and when player
d enters the game, he meets a coalition structure {{a}, {b}, {c}}. For sim-
plicity we will omit additional brackets and write P = {a, b, c}. In principle,
player d can be allocate to any of the three coalitions (players), or start a
new coalition. To determine the equilibrium allocation we must apply axiom
(iii) of Maskin (2003). According to this axiom, the player is allocated to
the coalition to which his gross marginal contribution is the largest. Let the
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values of the partition function be the following:
w(a; {a, b, c, d}) = 3
w(b; {a, b, c, d}) = 3
w(c; {a, b, c, d}) = 3
w(d; {a, b, c, d}) = 1
w(ad; {ad, b, c}) = 5
w(bd; {a, bd, c}) = 5
w(cd; {a, b, cd}) = 5
w(b; {ad, b, c}) = 1
w(c; {a, bd, c}) = 1
w(a; {a, b, cd}) = 1
w(c; {ad, b, c}) = 2
w(a; {a, bd, c}) = 2
w(b; {a, b, cd}) = 2
First, we notice that the game is superadditive that is for any Si and Sj the
following holds w(Si;P ) + w(Sj ;P ) ≤ w(Si ∪ Sj ;PSi∪Sj ):
∀ S 6= d such that S ∈ {a, b, c, d} : w(S; {a, b, c, d}) = 3 w(d; {a, b, c, d}) = 1
w(S ∪ d;PS∪d) = 5 > 3 + 1
The superadditivity implies that player d will not start a new coalition, since
his contribution to any coalition is greater than his stand alone value. Let’s
show that d also can not be allocated to a, b, or c:
(i) d can not be allocated to a. We find that
w(bd; {a, bd, c})− w(b; {ad, b, c}) > w(cd; {a, b, cd})− w(c; {ad, b, c}) 4 > 3
this means that coalition a will compete for player d with coalition b.
We check that
w(ad; {ad, b, c})− w(a; {a, bd, c}) < w(bd; {a, bd, c})− w(b; {ad, b, c}) 3 < 4
hence, player d can not be assigned to a.
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(ii) d can not join b. The best alternative to b is c, because
w(ad; {ad, b, c})− w(a; {a, bd, c}) < w(cd; {a, b, cd})− w(c; {a, bd, c}) 4 < 3
Morevore, the contribution of d to coalition c is greater than to b
w(bd; {a, bd, c})− w(b; {a, b, cd}) < w(cd; {a, b, cd})− w(c; {a, bd, c}) 3 < 4
therefore, d will not be allocated to b
(iii) c can not hold d. Under the partition {a, b, cd} the relative contribution
of d to a is larger than to b
w(bd; {a, bd, c})− w(b; {a, b, cd}) < w(ad; {ad, b, c})− w(a; {a, b, cd}) 4 < 3
this means that c has to compete with a to get d. In this case, however,
w(cd; {a, b, cd})− w(c; {ad, b, c}) < w(ad; {ad, b, c})− w(a; {a, b, cd}) 3 < 4
so we infer that d will not join c
Hence, we have shown that there is no equilibrium allocation for d and
proposition 4 is proved.
Appendix C
To prove proposition 5 we again take an example of four players N =
{a, b, c, d}. We consider the game, which the players enter in natural order
θ: (a, b, c, d). Let player d enters the game when the players are organized
in partition P = {a, b, c}. Below we provide a partition function for which
there exist more than one equilibrium allocation of d.
The values of the partition function be the following:
w(a; {a, b, c, d}) = 4
w(b; {a, b, c, d}) = 4
w(c; {a, b, c, d}) = 4
w(d; {a, b, c, d}) = 1
w(ad; {ad, b, c}) = 5
w(bd; {a, bd, c}) = 5
w(cd; {a, b, cd}) = 5
w(b; {ad, b, c}) = 3
w(c; {ad, b, c}) = 2
w(c; {a, bd, c}) = 2
w(a; {a, bd, c}) = 3
w(a; {a, b, cd}) = 1
w(b; {a, b, cd}) = 1
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We check that the game is superadditive:
∀ S 6= d and S ∈ {a, b, c, d} : w(S; {a, b, c, d}) = 4 w(d; {a, b, c, d}) = 1
(5)
w(S ∪ d;PS∪d) = 5 ≥ 4 + 1
Notice that all externalities are nonpositive: for any i 6= j: w(i; {a, b, c, d}) ≥
w(i; {jd, ..}):
w(a; {a, b, c, d}) = 4 ≥ w(a; {a, bd, c}) = 3
w(a; {a, b, c, d}) = 4 ≥ w(a; {a, b, cd}) = 1
w(b; {a, b, c, d}) = 4 ≥ w(b; {ad, b, c}) = 3
w(b; {a, b, c, d}) = 4 ≥ w(b; {a, b, cd}) = 1
w(c; {a, b, c, d}) = 4 ≥ w(c; {ad, b, c}) = 2
w(c; {a, b, c, d}) = 4 ≥ w(c; {a, bd, c}) = 2
Thus, the merger of d and any player imposes a loss on a third party.
Now we proceed with the allocation of player d. Applying axiom (iii) of
Maskin (2003), we compare the contribution of d to different coalitions.
(i) d can be allocated to a. We find that
w(bd; {a, bd, c})− w(b; {ad, b, c}) < w(cd; {a, b, cd})− w(c; {ad, b, c}) 2 < 3
that means that coalition a will compete for player d with coalition c.
Since
w(ad; {ad, b, c})− w(a; {a, b, cd}) > w(cd; {a, b, cd})− w(c; {ad, b, c}) 4 > 3
according to the solution of Maskin (2003) player d can be allocated
to a.
(ii) d can be allocated to b. We find that the best alternative to b is c, since
w(ad; {ad, b, c})− w(a; {a, bd, c}) < w(cd; {a, b, cd})− w(c; {a, bd, c}) 2 < 3
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We observe that the contribution of d to b is larger than to c
w(bd; {a, bd, c})− w(b; {a, b, cd}) > w(cd; {a, b, cd})− w(c; {a, bd, c}) 4 > 3
therefore, we conclude d can join b.
(iii) c can not hold d. Under the partition {a, b, cd} the contributions of d
to a and b are equal
w(bd; {a, bd, c})− w(b; {a, b, cd}) = w(ad; {ad, b, c})− w(a; {a, b, cd}) 4 = 4
In this case we should check both coalitions, whether d can join them
w(cd; {a, b, cd})− w(c; {ad, b, c}) < w(ad; {ad, b, c})− w(a; {a, b, cd}) 3 < 4
w(cd; {a, b, cd})− w(c; {a, bd, c}) < w(bd; {a, bd, c})− w(b; {a, b, cd}) 3 < 4
thus, c fails to attract d from both a and b.
According to the results of (i) and (ii), we have obtained that d can be
allocated to both a and b. Hence, we have multiple equilibria.
Appendix D
In this section we prove that proposition 5 provides a sufficient condition
for an equilibrium under the solution of Maskin (2003) to exist.
Consider an arbitrary game (N,w) and fix some order θ. Let’s take an
arbitrary node (P, i), in which player i enters the game and observe partition
P with coalitional profits described by function w˜. Assume that there is
the only coalition S such that its worth depends on the allocation of i:
w˜(S;PS′∪i) 6= w˜(S;PS′′∪i) for any S
′
, S
′′ 6= S.
Since the contribution of i to coalitions in P \ S is always the same, we can
arrange these coalitions according to the contribution of i in ascending order.
Denote by S′ the coalition with the greatest contribution w˜(S′ ∪ i;PS′∪i)−
w˜(S′ ; ·) ≥ w˜(S′′ ∪ i;PS′′∪i) − w˜(S
′′ ; ·) where S′′ ∈ P \ S \ S′ . To prove the
proposition it is enough to consider whether the player can be allocated to
S
′ or S, since by our assumption S′ can overbid all other coalitions P \S\S′ .
(i) if the contribution of i to S under PS′∪i is smaller than the contribution
of i to S′ , then player i is allocated to S′ according to axiom (iii), since
w˜(S′ ∪ i)− w˜(S′) ≥ w˜(S ∪ i;PS∪i)− w˜(S;PS′∪i) ∀ S ∈ P \ S
′ (6)
(ii) if the contribution of i to S under PS′∪i is greater than the contribution
of i to S′ , then player i is allocated to S, because
w˜(S ∪ i;PS∪i)− w˜(S;PS′∪i) ≥ w˜(S
′ ∪ i)− w˜(S′) ∀ S′ ∈ P (7)
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Thus, we have shown that the equilibrium allocation exists and hence, propo-
sition (6) is proved.
Now we use proposition (6) to explain why we do not encounter the problem
of non-existence. First, notice that if the node (P, i) is such that |P | ≤ 2
following Maskin (2003) we can proved that an equilibrium exists. For the
other nodes we distinguish two cases: (I) when i is a producer and (II) when
i is a transiter.
(I) Suppose a producer enters the game. Since in our analysis we have only
two producers two situations are possible: (i) the other producer has already
arrived and (ii) the other producer will enter the game later.
(i) the producer can face the following coalitions: a coalition including the
rival producer and coalitions consisting of transiters only. The value of
the coalition with the other producer may depend on which alternative
the producer selects. All coalitions containing only transiters are not
affected by the choice of the producer, their value will be zero if the
producer does not join them. Thus, there is only one coalition such
that w˜(S;PS′∪i) 6= w˜(S;PS′′∪i) and we can apply proposition 6.
(ii) if the other producer comes later, the present coalitions include only
transiters. The value of coalitions with the transiters, who are com-
plementary to the producer, does depend on which alternative the pro-
ducer chooses. But in principle, the allocation of the producer may
affect the allocation of the other producer and hence, it might matter
for the transiters who are complementary to the other producer. If
these transiters form one coalition or there is only one such transiter,
we can use proposition 6. Otherwise, there are two coalitions for which
the allocation of the producer might be relevant. Fortunately, even in
this case we can use proposition 6, because
(a) If Russia enters the game and Turkmenistan follows, then the
coalitions at question are Azerbaijan and Iran. These players are
symmetric and the allocation of Russia affects them in a similar
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way, therefore it is enough to consider only one of them. If there
is only one coalition is such that w˜(S;PS′∪i) 6= w˜(S;PS′′∪i), we
can use proposition 6.
(b) If Turkmenistan enters the game and Russia follows, then the
coalitions at question are Ukraine and Belarus. We find that
the allocation of Turkmenistan does not change the preference of
Russia on which transiter to join. Thus, for all coalitions which
w˜(S;PS′∪i) = w˜(S;PS′′∪i) and by proposition 6 the equilibrium
exists.
(II) Now we look at the situation when a transiter enters the game. Here,
we will distinguish three cases: (i) both producers are present, (ii) a com-
plementary producer is absent, and (iii) both producers are absent.
(i) in the presence of both producers the allocation of the transiter is rel-
evant for at most two coalitions, those including the producers, since
his contribution to any other coalition is zero. The situation reduces
to P ≤ 2 and the result of Maskin (2003) can be used.
(ii) in this case we should take into account that the allocation of the tran-
siter may change the allocation of the complementary producer, who
comes later. In this respect, the allocation of the transiter may affect
the value of the coalition including the other producer. Besides, the
allocation choice matters for the other complement transiter, if he is
present. The other coalitions are irrelevant, their value is zero and
we can neglect them. Hence, we obtain that only two coalitions are
relevant and we again use the proof of Maskin (2003).
(iii) when both producers are absent, the observed coalitions consist of
transiters. We are interested only in the case when there are three
coalitions. The allocation of the transiter might matter only for the
transiters complementary to the other producer. Since the allocation
of the transiter may change the preferences of his complementary pro-
ducer that, in turn, by (ii) of (I) can lead to the change in the allocation
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of the other producer. However, as we have discussed in (ii) of (I), in
this case the equilibrium will exist.
Appendix E
In the table below we report the profits of essential partitions, namely for
coalitions including producers. The profits are calculated for different vari-
ants with regard to investment options available. The left part of the table
starts with the variant "all options" which is followed by "minus one option"
figures, the excluded option is given in the title. Thus, "-Upgrade" means,
that the players can not invest in the upgrade of the old Ukrainian system,
but have all the others options available. The right part of the table take
"status quo" variant as a basis. In every next row we include one pipeline -
the one given in the heading.
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Table 3: Coalitional profits in $bn
{t} {t, a} {t, a, i} ∪{t} {t} {t, a} {t, a, i} ∪{t}
{r} all 4.6; 0 3.7; 2.2 3.0; 3.2 5.7 status quo 0; 0 0; 0 0; 0 0
-Upgrade +Upgrade
-Yamal2 +Yamal2
-NEGP 0; 0 0; 3.0 0; 4.7 5.2 +NEGP 4.6; 0 4.6; 0 4.6; 0 5.7
-TCP 4.6; 0 3.7; 2.2 +TCP 0; 3.0 0; 3.0 3.2
-TCP,Nab 4.6; 0 4.6; 0 +TCP,Nab 0; 3.0 0; 3.0 5.2
{r, b} all 5.8; 0 4.8; 2.1 4.0; 3.1 7.0 status quo 3.5; 0 3.5; 0 3.5; 0 3.7
-Upgrade +Upgrade
-Yamal2 5.3; 0 4.4; 2.2 3.7; 3.2 6.4 +Yamal2 5.8; 0 5.8; 0 5.8; 0 7.0
-NEGP +NEGP 5.3; 0 5.3; 0 5.3; 0 6.4
-TCP 5.8; 0 4.8; 2.1 +TCP 3.1; 2.7 3.1; 2.7 5.7a
-TCP,Nab 5.8; 0 5.8; 0 +TCP,Nab 3.1; 2.7 2.8; 4.0 9.3b
{r, u} all 6.5; 0 5.5 ; 2.1 4.6; 3.0 7.7 status quo 6.3; 0 6.3; 0 6.3; 0 7.2
-Upgrade 6.3; 0 5.5 ; 2.2 4.6; 3.0 7.5 +Upgrade 6.5; 0 6.5; 0 6.5; 0 7.7
-Yamal2 +Yamal2
-NEGP +NEGP 6.3; 0 6.3; 0 6.3; 0 7.5
-TCP 6.5; 0 5.5 ; 2.1 +TCP 5.4; 2.2 5.4; 2.2 7.5c
-TCP,Nab 6.5; 0 6.5; 0 +TCP,Nab 5.4; 2.2 4.6; 3.0 7.5d
{r, b, u} all 6.6; 0 5.6; 2.1 4.7; 2.9 8.1 status quo 6.6; 0 6.6; 0 6.6; 0 8.1
-Upgrade +Upgrade
-Yamal2 +Yamal2
-NEGP +NEGP
-TCP 6.6; 0 5.6; 2.1 +TCP 5.6; 2.0 5.6; 2.0 8.1e
-TCP,Nab 6.6; 0 6.6; 0 +TCP,Nab 5.6; 2.0 4.7; 2.9 8.1f
aw({r, t, b, a, i}; {{r, t, b, a, i}, {, u}})
bw({r, t, b, a, i}; {{r, t, b, a, i}, {u}})
cw({r, t, u, a, i}; {{r, t, u, a, i}, {b}})
dw({r, t, u, a, i}; {{r, t, u, a, i}, {b}})
ew(N ; {N})
fw(N ; {N})
Abkuerzungen
Abkuerzung Erklaerung
bcm/a billion cubic meter per year
EU European Union
FSU Former Soviet Union
LNG liquified natural gas
NEGP North European Gas Pipeline
NTG North Trans Gas
tcm thousand cubic meter per year
TCP Trans-Caspian Pipeline
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